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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis, Understanding the Persistence of the Nkonya-Alavanyo Conflict: An Nkonya 
Perspective, is an investigative enquiry into the reasons why in spite of all efforts to solve the 
conflict between Nkonya and Alavanyo of the Volta Region of Ghana, the conflict has persisted 
to date.  
 
To do this, an ethnographic field trip was taken to Nkonya-Tayi where in addition to 
observations, open ended interviews were conducted. Among the themes sought during the 
interviews were the causes, effects, attempts at solving the conflict and most importantly why it 
has remained persistent.   
 
Apart from the ethnographic interviews, other sources both primary (court judgments, official 
letters written in relation to the case, press releases among others) and secondary (books, book 
chapters, articles, lecture notes, as well as online documents) were also looked at. 
 
The data gathered from observation and interviews which were mostly recorded was transcribed 
and then synchronised with the existing theoretical literature particularly the work of Azar on 
Protracted Social Conflict and other related literature to produce results. 
 
The conclusions deduced thereof suggest that according to the Nkonyas, the conflict has 
remained insoluble primarily because of human need factors made manifest in the land question 
and its related issues such as security, justice and peace among others which have not been well 
attended to over the years. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1. INTODUCTION 
 
1.1.Introduction 
 
The year 2000, was exactly twenty one years since Mazrui’s (1979) The African Condition, in 
which he argued that Africa by virtue of its numerous resources was the richest and yet the 
poorest continent on earth. In that same year 2000, The Economist (2000) carried as its headline, 
‘Hopeless Africa’. The paper argued that the troubles confronting the continent seemed so 
paramount that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) at the request of the United States 
of America started the year 2000 with a ‘month of Africa’. Similarly, Tony Bair, remarked in 
2001 that ‘the state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world’ (The Guardian, 2001). Not 
surprisingly, of the forty two (42) Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) in the world in 2004, a 
World Bank Report (2004) confirmed that thirty four (34) were in Africa with fourteen (14) out 
of the sixteen (16) West African countries being part of the list. Much of the problems of the 
continent and their resultant labelling has to do with its numerous violent conflicts. Indeed, 
violence is not new to Africa as the continent has been inundated with violent conflicts from its 
very inception. But contrary to the omnibus assumption or distortion that conflicts in Africa are 
entirely different both in form and character when juxtaposed with others elsewhere in the world, 
Zeleza (2008, p. 2) argues they are ‘remarkably unexceptional: they have complex histories; they 
exhibit multiple and multidimensional causes, courses and consequences’. Unfortunately, 
however, as Azar (1990) notes, this league of warfare and extreme poverty deflates the 
citizenry’s ability to finding answers to their numerous problems.  
Conflict refers to the fight over ‘values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources in which 
the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralize, 
injure or eliminate the rivals’(Coser, 1968, p. 232). Similarly, Persaud and Turner (2007, p. 417) 
equates conflict to the ‘disagreement between two or more parties in which one or all perceive(s) 
a denial of a right, or resources, or the absence of capacity to obtain justice which leads to anger, 
hurt, hate, and possibly verbal and violent actions and reaction resulting in damage to person(s), 
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emotionally and physically, and /or property’. For the purpose of this thesis, by way of 
conceptualisation, conflict will refers to the pursuits of irreconcilable goals by diverse groups.  
So far, the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been extended to Somalia. Sudan and South 
Sudan has also not been best of neighbours. Kenya is still trembling under the threats posed by 
Al Shabaab militants. Chad, Central Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo is still not 
stable (Prendergast, 2014). Peace has become a rare commodity especially after the Arab spring 
in the Northern part of Africa; Libya is still on fire and Egypt is still fairly unstable whilst 
Tunisia is barely on its feet.  
West Africa, like most parts of Africa has had its own share of violence emanating especially 
from military take overs and ethnic diversities. Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leon are still 
nursing the wounds of their decades of civil wars. Mali is still troubled by the Tuaregs’ bid to 
secede from the independent state. At the same time, the world is still awakening from the 2012 
military coup d’état in Mali and its resultant hostilities that saw the intervention of global giants 
like France, USA, as well as hosts of countries and international organizations (Bøås, 2015; 
Downie, 2014). In Burkina, the 2014 violent protest that saw the resignation of President Blaise 
Compaoré from office and the momentarily take over by the military (BBC, 2014) has put the 
country on the spotlight as events are still being observed with mixed feelings. The danger of 
Ebola has not only threatened the very existence of Guinean, Liberian and Sierra Leonean 
societies but has equally succeeded in making the region unattractive. Today, Boko Haram has 
extended its insurgencies from Nigeria to neighbouring Cameroun and Chad making insecurity 
in Nigeria more of a sub-regional headache. The list can be tall if not endless.  
Given this background, Edi (2006, p. 7) writes that, the sub region is the ‘riskiest region in 
Africa’. Similarly, Boafo-Arthur (2008, p. 8) has concluded that the ‘West African sub-region is 
a region in turmoil’. The result of all these conflicts as William (2011) notes have been vast 
human suffering; millions of lives have been lost, diseases and malnutrition has soured to 
unparalleled levels as healthcare has been completely crushed, education and infrastructural 
development seriously affected while the continent’s natural resources and the ecological belt 
remain badly harmed. 
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It is in the midst of all these conundrums that Ghana has risen to be arguably, an oasis of peace 
in a sub region inundated with political crises and civil wars. Although, the recent peaceful 
adjudication at the Supreme Court of the 2012 Presidential Election petition1 goes a long way to 
underscore this point, it is worth mentioning that why Ghana is largely accorded, appropriately 
or erroneously, as a peaceful hub in the sub-region is not the burden of this thesis. However, 
notwithstanding this relative stability, there have been instances of communal violence most of 
which occasionally flare into violent confrontations with consequential loss of lives and assets 
(Tsikata & Seini, 2004; WACSI & SIPRI Report, 2011).  
Depending on the nature, scale and dynamics, conflicts in Ghana can be grouped into various 
categories; Inter ethnic conflicts which are mostly fought over land and for political supremacy; 
intra-ethnic (usually disputes over succession); religious violence between and among the three 
major religious bodies of Christianity, Islam and the Traditional African Religion. Violence from 
political parties/opposition as well as industrial unrest between employers and employees and 
football related violence have over the years also become very prominent (Tsikata & Seini 
(2004). These violence as Tonah (2007) points out have been confined to specific areas and have 
not threatened the hegemony of the country in spite of the fact that their effects are felt by the 
entire country. Some of the conflicts include Mamprusi and Kusaase (Upper east Region) 
Konkomba and Nanumba, Nawuri and the Gonja, Abudu and Andani, (Northern Region) 
Akropong-Akuapim (Eastern Region) and Abiriw, Tachiman and Tuobodom (Brong Ahafo), 
Juaso chieftaincy dispute (Ashanti Region) Pekis and the Tsitos as well as the Nkonya and 
Alavanyo conflict (Volta Region) (Mahama, 2003; Tonah, 2007; Tsikata & Seini, 2004). 
To Tonah (2007), a noteworthy characteristic of these conflicts in Ghana and the entire sub 
region is that regardless of their fundamental bases, ethnicity inadvertently tends to play a key 
part in them. It is worth pointing out that the multiplicity of ethnic groups in Ghana (over ninety 
                                                          
1 In the wake of a post-election disputes in the 2012 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Ghana that 
pronounced the current President, John Dramani Mahama (of the NDC) as winner, political tensions went high and 
threatened to explode. Many well-wishers and peace loving Ghanaians mostly of the political class and traditional 
leadership called on the various political parties not to resort to violence. Consequently, the defeated candidate, 
N.A.D. Akufo-Addo (of the NPP) chose to go to court to challenge the results. In a televised ruling that span a 
period of eight months, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and reaffirmed the position of the Electoral 
Commission (Judgment, 2013). Accordingly, Nana Addo accepted the verdict calling on his supporters and party 
faithful to do same (The Chronicle, 2013).   
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ethnic groups, see Frempong, 2006) and by extension the entire continent, makes the question of 
ethnicity and ethnic conflict more prominent. A common feature of these conflicts also is that 
most of them seemed to have defied the innumerable attempts at resolving them. 
This research will delve into the almost a century long conflict between Nkonya and Alavanyo in 
Ghana, a living example of such conflicts that have become insoluble in the country. By a critical 
analysis, the research will endeavour to find answers to the following; 
a. The rational and the causes of the conflict. 
b. Its effect on the people. 
c.  Interventions made at solving it. 
d. The reasons for it persistence to date. 
 
The next chapter, titled Literature Review provides a conceptual overview and background of the 
area and the case under study. In this section, the existing literature, especially books, chapters, 
articles, research papers, newspapers as well as court judgments specific to the conflict are 
looked at. Other works that although do not throw light on the case but sheds light on the 
research questions under investigation are also reviewed.  
This will be followed by the methodological section in the third chapter. In this section, I first 
begin with a construction of the methods used; in-depth interviews and observations. I also draw 
attention to the preparations I made before embarking on the field trip. Other sources of 
information mostly secondary sources are also highlighted. The chapter ends with some few 
reflections worth pointing out. 
In chapter four, I begin by introducing Azar’s Protracted Social Conflict (PSC). Afterwards the 
interviews realized from the field are also presented in two part. The first part deals with 
background and causes of the conflict with the second part focusing on the endurance of the 
conflict. The data from the interview is discussed in light of both Azar’s PSC theory and other 
additional literature where necessary especially in the area of jurisprudence to produce answers 
to the given research questions. 
Chapter five presents a summary of the entire work stressing once more on the empirical and 
theoretical enquiry. A hint about whether or not the conflict under study is an inter-ethnic 
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conflict is also mentioned. Some suggestions for further research that propped up in the cause of 
the study are also established. The thesis ends on a note of optimism about its significance for 
future studies or researches on the conflict between Nkonya and Alavanyo.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1.Introduction 
 
This chapter takes a critical look at the Alavanyo and Nkonya conflict by interrogating the 
various research works available. This review will be based primarily on existing works specific 
to the case under study and any other material that sheds light on the issues raised in the various 
scholarly works. This will help establish the various approaches taken on the case and identify 
the gaps in them. It will also help give a holistic idea about the background of the people and the 
conflict under review. The chapter will end by launching the direction or the focus of my 
research on the case. It is worth noting that although the main theoretical framework of this 
thesis is Azar’s Protracted Social Conflict Theory (PSC), it will be introduced and further 
discussed in chapter four under the title, ‘Findings’. This so because, the theory is closely linked 
with the interviews presented in chapter four and therefore presenting them together will offer 
some coherence and further an understanding of the link between the two. 
 
2.2.Ethnic Conflict in Ghana 
 
Africa has had to deal with violent conflicts from its very beginning to the present time. 
Attempts at finding lasting solutions to the status quo by International organizations, 
governments, and individuals, among many other entities have yielded very limited dividends. 
Prominent among the various causes of the conflict on the continent is its ethnic diversity which 
although existed before colonialism, was poorly grouped into various states under their 
respective colonial masters. It has therefore been argued for example that the European 
Colonialists who are talked of as largely been responsible for the formation of the modern 
African states did not take into account the existing differences between most groups before 
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creating the various states2. In support of this position, Mazuri (2008, p. 36) writes that the 
origins of these conflicts ‘lie in the white legacy’. Oyeniyi (2011) confirms this when he posits 
that the failure on the part of the colonialist in considering the cultural distinctions of the various 
ethnic identities before restructuring them into the colonial states still remains one of the ultimate 
trials of post-colonial Africa. 
 
Today, ethnicity remains a strong factor of social reality in Africa especially after colonial rule 
(Oyeniyi, 2011).  The ethnicity debate basically revolves around two schools of thoughts; the 
primordialist and the instrumentalist for its meaning. According to the primordialist, ethnic 
groups share a mutual bond that defines their identity and ‘turns the group into a natural 
community of a type that is older than the modern (state)’ (Van de Goor, 1994, p. 18 cited in 
Frempong, 2006). Bath (1969) throws light on this meaning when he explains that ethnic groups 
are fundamentally, biological group that shares essential cultural values being it overt or implied, 
similar fields of communication and the capacity to recognize and be recognized by others as a 
group distinguishable from others with similar traits. Hale (2004) also identifies ethnic identity 
as a kind of social sensor or device through which individuals and societies come to establish and 
understand where they stand in relation to the larger human environment. This school of 
understanding is also endorsed by Tsikata and Seini (2004) who claim that analysts who view 
ethnicity from a primordial angle are right in the sense that, they cannot easily be assumed or 
discarded. Tonah (2007, p. 6) on his part argues that ethnicity embraces the construction of 
dissimilarities being it actual or perceived, among social groups. To him, its characteristics are 
synonymous with other similar social units such as the clan and lineage who are primarily 
concerned with defining the social environment into the ‘we’ and ‘them’ groups.  In a sense 
therefore this approach fixes ethnicity at birth and contends that it is grounded on deep seated 
primeval connections.  
 
The instrumentalist on the flip side also view ethnicity as a mechanism through which people 
usually leaders mobilize and influence people for their own parochial interest (Van de Goor, 
                                                          
2 Present day Nigeria, which was created by the British for instance included three main nations of the Yoruba (in 
the west), Muslim Hausa (in the north) and the Ibo (in the East) as well as several smaller groups each of which is 
very distinct from the other. ‘This artificial mixture was to lead to one of Africa’s great human tragedies, the 
Nigerian civil war of 1967–70’. (Mazrui, 2008, p. 37).   
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1994, p. 18 cited in Frempong, 2006). This means that in the eyes of the instrumentalist, 
ethnicity is created, usually for exploitative purposes by leaders and is therefore rooted in 
historical as well as emblematic memory of a group. It is worth pointing out that the case in 
context exhibits semblances of both theoretical standpoints. 
 
While Boucher, Landis, and Clark (1987, p. 18) argue that differences between ‘ethnic groups 
have been and probably will continue to be-a primary source of unrest in the world’, Aapengnuo 
(2010, p. 2) advances a contrasting view when he argues that ethnic differences have not been a 
driving force for conflict but rather, it is when their differences are used as ‘barrier to 
advancement and opportunity’ that conflict ensue. Williams (2011) offers a parallel perspective 
to this when he contends that the perception that ethnic differences cause conflict is untenable.  
He notes that if ethnic differences cause conflicts, then the entire world would be in an unending 
state of conflict by virtue of the mirage of ethnic groups available.  He further states, citing the 
Somalia case3 as a classic example that by implication, ethnic differences is not the problem and 
neither is ethnic similarities the panacea. He contends instead that, 
 
‘…the so-called ethnic wars are usually the result of political power struggles 
between elites whose actions do not simply reflect static identities but instead 
shape identities and the political consequences that flow from them’(William, 
2011, p. 114).  
 
Whichever way one looks at ethnicity, there seem to be a correlation of a sort between ethnic 
relations and conflict. But what exactly do we mean when we label a conflict as ethnic conflict? 
Is the presence of two ethnic groups in a conflict as in the case of Nkonya and Alavanyo enough 
to attract the label ethnic or inter-ethnic conflict? Perhaps as an answer to this question, Brubaker 
(2004, p. 52) has suggested that ‘ethnically framed conflict-need not, and should not be 
understood as conflict between ethnic groups just as racially framed conflict need not to be 
understood as conflict between races’. Lake and Rothchild (1996, pp. 41-42) also paints a picture 
of ethnic conflicts as usually; 
                                                          
3 Somalia, while made up mostly of people sharing the similar ethnic background could not guarantee its people 
internal harmony.     
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‘…caused by collective fears of the future. As groups begin to fear for their 
safety, dangerous and difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain 
within them the potential for tremendous violence. As information failures, 
problems of credible commitment, and the security dilemma take hold, groups 
become apprehensive, the state weakens, and conflict becomes more likely. 
Ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs, operating within groups, build upon 
these fears and polarize society. Political memories and emotions also magnify 
these anxieties, driving groups further apart. Together, these between-group and 
within-group strategic interactions produce a toxic brew that can explode into 
murderous violence’. 
Markakis and Fukui (1994, p. 2) contend that the ethnic label given to most conflict appears 
‘simple’ and ‘obscure’ as they encompass a variety of purposes. They argue that its application 
in many conflict situations creates a lot of misunderstanding; a position that throws light on 
Horowitz’ (1985, p. xi) stand that there is ‘too much knowledge and not enough understanding’ 
on the issue of ethnicity. Aapengnuo (2010) also claim that, the labelling of the over twenty six 
inter-communal conflicts over resource and power in northern part of Ghana between the 80s and 
the 90s for example, which ended with the Guinea fowl war of 1994-1995 as ethnic conflict is 
perhaps from the above viewpoint completely fallacious.  
 
Ethnic conflict by extension to Bates (1982) refers to disagreements between ‘rational agents 
over scarce resources’. Tsikata and Seini (2004, p. 2) affirms this position when they established 
that often times, inter-ethnic conflict in Ghana revolve around the ‘control of land and other 
resources and sovereignty issues’. While the basic resource under contention in the Nkonya 
Alavanyo conflict is land, and fought along ethnic lines, it will be a hasty conclusion to affirm or 
otherwise that the case is an ethnic conflict at this stage without subjecting it to further empirical 
scrutiny.  
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2.3.Background Knowledge on the Nkonya and Alavanyo Conflict 
 
Formally part of the Jiasikan District until 2008, Nkonya (ethnic Guans)4 is currently part of the 
Biakoye District. Alavanyo (ethnic Ewes) on the other hand, with its total population of 9,714 
(Males 4736 and females 4979) is also part of the Hohoe Municipality all of which are in the 
Volta Region of Ghana (Hohoe Municipal Assembly, n.d.). These two communities share 
common boundary in spite of the fact that they belong to different administrative zones (see 
picture 2.1. below). However, they have not been the best of neighbours for over ninety years 
now as the two communities have against all odds been locked up together in a protracted 
conflict over a piece of land.  
 
    Picture 2.1. Map showing districts in the Volta Region of Ghana. (Picture taken courtesy, All about Ghana, 
Regions and cities, n.d.). 
                                                          
4 Olson (1996) noted in his, The people of Africa; an Ethnohistorical Dictionary, that the population of the Nkonyas 
at the time stood at over 25000. Currently, according to the 2010 Population and Housing Census in Ghana, the 
population of the Biakoye District is 65,901 which represents 3.1% of the entire population in the Volta Region. 
Note that, although other non Nkonya towns may be part of the district, the Nkonya’s constitute the majority of the 
residents in the district (Ghana Statistical Service Report, 2014). 
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An Nkonya chronicle asserts that the Guans were the first settlers of their present day location, 
long before the coming of the Europeans in 1484. A claim Nana Okotor Kofi III argues is yet to 
be refuted5. The Alavanyos according to Dzathor6 (1999, pp. 51-55) were fugitives who flew 
persecution from their original home in Saviefe through Akrofu to Soviet (near Kpando), to their 
present location. His version points that the Alavanyos, who were originally known as Bubulu-
Bu were upon the request of Fia Tatse Koku, granted residence in their current location by 
Kondodze of Nkonya Akloba on accounts of their friendship.  The Alavanyos were subsequently 
given a place called ‘Loklunbo’ (literally meaning Dark Mountain) before being relocated to 
their current location. Upon settling on the apportioned piece of land and realising that the place 
was not very attractive, their leader To declared: ‘miamo fii kpo; adabanyo’ which means that 
‘let us venture into settling here; it might turn out to be successful’. It is worth mentioning that 
‘adabanyo’ is what has been corrupted over the years to mean Alavanyo. Ohene (2013) also 
corroborates this story and gives the actual year for the Alavanyo occupation as 1840.   
 
2.4.Causes of the conflict 
 
According to an Nkonya narrative, evidence of this conflict dates back to the early days of 
Ghana’s colonial history. This account contends that the first violent incident erupted out of a 
dispute between two individual residents of Nkonya-Tayi and Alavanyo-Kpeme over a piece of 
land within the now disputed area. The attempt to resolve this conflict saw the various 
communities seeking assistance from the colonial authorities. Ultimately, it resulted in the 
designing of a map by a German Cartographer called Dr Hans Grunner7 in 1913. Nevertheless 
the map did very little to settle the dispute as the Alavanyos who were dissatisfied claimed that 
                                                          
5 This was made in a press release, written and signed By Nana Okotor Kofi III for the Nkonya Traditional Council 
(January 3, 2013) 
6  Dzathor Paul K. is a renowned writer who hails from Alavanyo traditional area and his work which throws light 
on the Nkonya narrative has on many occasions been referred to by the Nkonyas. 
7 Dr. Hans Grunner is a renowned German cartographer, explorer and a colonial official appointed and stationed at 
the military post at Misahöhe in present day Togo then German Togoland. He is still famous for his outstanding 
knowledge of the Ewe customs and tradition to date. He is also credited as being the architect behind most treaties 
within the colonial state and also steered consultations that eventually gave birth to the actual territories of Togo. 
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the map favoured the Nkonyas. They have instead relied on a local Anyaa tree8 (see picture 2.2. 
below) as the true evidence for demarcating their borders with the Nkonyas (Nkonya Traditional 
Council, 2013; Yakohene, 2012). 
 
Some allegation have also been directed towards the upshots from the sharing of the erstwhile 
German Colonies to Principal Allied and Associated Powers as specified in the Treaty of 
Versailles on 28th June 1919. According to Article 119 of this treaty, Germany was mandated to 
relinquish her right and titles over her overseas territories, including German Togoland paving 
the way for its repossessions (Kumado & Gyandoh, 2009). Based on the consent of the League 
of Nations, Britain and France became the administrative authorities in German Togoland and 
subsequently demarcated the area (The Covenant of the League of Nations, 1924). The part that 
went to Britain was called British Togoland9 (now Volta Region of the Republic of Ghana where 
Nkonyas and Alavanyo are found) and the French part named French Togoland which also refers 
to present day Republic of Togo. The main contention of this argument is that although the 
demarcation exercise by Britain and France recognised a clear boundary between Ghana and 
Togo, the inland borderline delimitations prepared at the time did little to remedy the prevailing 
border conflict between the Nkonyas and Alavanyos. Instead, it has been consistently argued that 
it rather deepened the already discordant seeds that had been sown between them (Yakohene, 
2012).  
 
With time, the conflict has taken different shapes and tangents. While a number of the 
escalations have been triggered by land related issues, an outbreak in 1983 was largely out of a 
conflict between two individuals over the fetching of water. This quickly escalated into an 
Nkonya-Alavanyo affair with resultant loss of lives. This development sheds light on the Volta 
Regional Minister’s position that the intervallic turbulence between the Alavanyo and Nkonya 
communities, goes beyond just a land quarrel (Joy Online News, 2013). (See the next chapter for 
a comprehensive understanding of issues as they exist on the field, Nkonya-Tayi). 
                                                          
8 The Anyaa tree known as Ntome in the Akan language is highly medicinal and nutritious as food ingredient. In the 
not too distant past, (I suspect some still do) many villages used it for making bath houses or foundational pillars for 
backyard gardens. They are also commonly used in the demarcation of boundaries in Ghana to date.  
9 This area went under a plebiscite in 1956 to determine whether or not they wanted to be part of independent 
Ghana. Consequently they voted to join and later became the now Volta Region of Ghana. 
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Picture 2.2. Anyaa tree (Picture taken during the field trip). 
 
2.5.Historical Antecedents and Efforts at Solving the Conflict 
  
Since 1923 when the first violent occurrence was documented between the Nkonya and 
Alavanyo during an Empire Day Celebration10, occasional violent incidences have been reported 
especially between 1980 and 2013 (Tsikata & Seini, 2004). Various exertions made by 
successive governments, concerned citizens, and private organisations and related non-
governmental bodies at solving the conflict between the two communities have not yielded any 
                                                          
10 Originally organized on May 24th, 1904 which happens to be the birthday of Queen Victoria (the Monarch under 
whose control the contemporary British Empire had risen into prominence) with the main objective of imparting 
imperial loyalty into the minds of the youth in Britain. The idea further spread to include the entire British empire. 
However after WW II as the empire dissolved, so did the interest in this holiday. In the end, the holiday was 
renamed ‘Commonwealth Day’ in 1958 and moved to the second Monday in March. Since then the celebration has 
remained in name only.   
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result. The inability of the various efforts in obviously bagging the much needed peace package 
clearly establishes the need for innovative approaches to solving this conflict.   
 
To the Nkonyas, the earliest attempt at solving the conflict was in 1913 when Dr Hans Grunner 
was contacted to survey the lands and demarcate the boarders between them. Although the map 
which was titled ‘Karte des Sechsherrenstockes' appears to have been widely accepted by almost 
all the six communities of Nkonya, Alavanyo, Gbi, Santrokofi, Akpafu and Bowiri, the 
Alavanyos, however, have remained discontented over the years over its authenticity (Tsikata & 
Seini, 2004).  Another effort is made manifest in the setting up of various settlement committees 
aimed at coming up with a lasting solution to the conflict. In November 1992 for example, the 
Jerry John Rawlings led Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government launched an 
investigative work into the Nkonya and Alavanyo conflict with the aim of providing 
recommendations for policy actions on the crisis. Similarly, the District Chief Executives of both 
Hohoe and Jiasikan Districts put together another committee of enquiry dubbed, the Mireku 
Committee to launch an investigation into the matter and consequently submit a report that will 
advance the course of peace between the two communities in 1995 (Agyemang-Duah, 2008; 
Yakohene, 2012).   
 
More so, the presence of the state has also been felt by the continuous provision of security 
through the deployment of both the police and the military. In 1997 for example, following 
complains by Nkonyas at the Hohoe Divisional Police Command, a Mediation Committee was 
put up to arbitrate the complains. A similar report was also filed by the Alavanyos in which the 
police actively partook in its dispensation (Tsikata & Seini, 2004). A joint police and military 
squad was also deployed in September 2002 by the Volta Regional Security Committee which 
ultimately resulted in the arrest of eleven suspects reported to be in possession of locally 
manufactured guns and Indian hemp on June 26, 2003. In a similar task, the joint taskforce 
seized a large amount of weapons being chaperoned from Alavanyo-Deme towards Alavanyo 
Kpeme (Tsikata & Seini, 2004). More recently, following renewed tensions which resulted in the 
death of two people from Nkonya Tayi, the security personnel were deployed to deal with the 
situations. In an interview with The Daily Graphic (2013), the Deputy Regional Minister hinted 
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that security officials were on an attachment to the area. Similarly, at the time of the field trip to 
the Nkonya area, heavy military and police presence were seen in place.  
  
Another area that has featured prominently in resolving the conflict is in the area of 
jurisprudence. The court as an institution has been at the forefront of adjudication. Indeed the 
matter has over the years moved from lower courts to as far as the highest court of the land; the 
Appeals Court which is equivalent to the present day Supreme Court of Ghana. Interestingly, the 
Nkonyas have won almost all the court cases between 1953 and 1980 where they have 
consistently tendered the Grunner map in evidence. This locus has always been challenged by 
the Alavanyos who continuously argue that per its small scale, the Grunner map cannot be a 
perfect map for the boundary demarcation. This stand was sharply contested in a ruling on 24th 
May, 1957 at the High Court of Justice, Land Division which was presided over by His Lordship 
Mr. Justice W.B. Van Lare. The judgment affirmed among other things that the Grunner Map of 
1913 was accepted by all parties at the time. The judgment further hinted that the map was 
binding on the parties involved in the border disputes and therefore whether or not the 
demarcation was done judicially or administrative was not an important matter for the court to 
deal with (Judgment, 1957)11.  
 
In reaction, the Alavanyos have also cited three colonial court rulings in their favour as a counter 
claim to the recent or post independent rulings (Tsikata & Seini, 2004). Though the cases have 
subsequently been appealed, the Alavanyos have continuously lost. In June 1959 for example, 
following an appeal of the judgement by Justice Van Lare in 1957 filed by the Alavanyos and 
presided over by His Lordship Granvile Sharp at the Court of Appeal, the court once again, ruled 
and established both the exactitude and genuineness of the 1913 Grunner map as the primary 
element of the border demarcation between the conflicting parties. Subsequently, the Alavanyos 
(defendants) were ‘estopped per rem judicatam’ (meaning that the matter has finally been 
established) (Judgment, 1959). Accordingly, the Alavanyos were ordered by the court to atone 
tenancy to the people of Nkonya as the rightful owners of the land in question (Judgment, 1970). 
Consequently, in line with the court orders, some Alavanyo citizens farming on the disputed area 
                                                          
11 This case was originally filled at the native court Akpini Native Court ‘B’ Kpandu in 1953 and was subsequently 
transferred to the High Court of Justice, Lands Division.  
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wrote to Nana Agya Atta IV, Chief of Nkonya-Tayi through his secretary, Peter Akuffu in which 
they duly gave recognition to the people of Nkonya as the rightful owners of their (Alavnyos) 
farm lands. (See appendix B for details, see also appendix C for list of Alavanyo citizens who 
atoned tenancy of the land in 1970 and 1975). 
 
Parliament on its part has also been very critical of the hostile developments in the region. 
Member of Parliament for Biakoye Constituency, Dr. Kwabena Adjei12 for instance made a 
statement on the floor of parliament in 2003 about the persistent hostilities in the area and called 
for high powered committee to investigate the issue. Consequently, the Volta Regional Minister, 
was at the request of some members of parliament called for questioning relative to the security 
issues in the area on the floor of parliament. The Volta Regional Parliamentary Caucus has also 
displayed their commitment to the peace process and other related activities in the area. Mr 
Prince Hayibor (MP for Hohoe North) and Kwasi Babdua (MP for Biakoye) for instance in 2006 
gave their accents for the enactment of a spiritual re-unification right between the two 
communities aimed at bringing lasting peace (Yakohene, 2012).  
 
The Volta Regional House of Chief (VRHC) which is made up of the various paramount chiefs 
in the region has also contributed immensely to dealing with the conflict. Most of their efforts 
have been open condemnation of the hostilities. In 2003, the body issued a statement urging the 
respective paramount chiefs and their people to exercise restraint and accordingly, appointed a 
three-member committee led by the paramount chief of Buem to institute a reconciliatory 
process between Nkonya and Alavanyo (Yakohene, 2012).  Again in 2013, in the wake of rising 
hostilities, the Volta Regional House of chiefs summoned an emergency meeting of its members. 
During this meeting, severe sanctions against the two paramount chiefs of Nkonya and 
Alavanyo, were proposed to dissuade them from further supporting the hostilities. However, the 
paramount chief of Alavanyo called this as a bluff claiming that the house could have done better 
instead of just issuing mere statement (Agbewode, 2013). The failure of the above mentioned 
interventions pushed the two communities into petitioning the Government of Ghana for a new 
                                                          
12 Dr Kwabena Adjei (a renowned Nkonya man) and one time majority leader of parliament is currently the 
chairman of the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC).  
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approach in dealing with the matter. This communal intervention embraced the use of the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms (ADR) under the framework of mediation in 2003.  
 
ADR is perceived as a perfect relief from the laborious and expensive court room litigations. 
ADR was given a presidential accent and latter entrenched in Ghanaian laws called ADR Act 
2010 (Act 798) (Yakohene, 2012). Midodzi and Imoro (2011) argue that although several 
mechanisms exist in the angle of conflict resolution, the best practice should be adopted in 
relation to the existing culture of the particular conflict and area. In this regard, they contend that 
the choice of the ADR in the case under scrutiny was in the right direction. Chigas and David 
(2000) posit that ADR embody a variety of techniques for settling conflicts and includes 
independent mediations, non-binding foreign involvements which involves reconciliation, as 
well as binding arbitration. This means that with the help of a neutral third party, the ADR 
engages the disputant parties in their quest for peace. On her part Yakohene (2012, p. 65) defines 
ADR as a set of procedures that presents ‘alternatives to litigation through the courts for the 
resolution of disputes’. 
 
For this reason, the Nkonya-Alavanyo Conflict Mediation Committee13 with its working branch, 
the Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) was established under the John Kofour led New 
Patriotic Party (NPP) administration on June 2004 under the auspices of the Volta Regional 
Coordinating Council (VRCC). The Committee was led by Rt. Rev. Dr Livingstone Buama, 
(Moderator of the Evangelical Presbyterian Church-E.P.C) and ably assisted by Rt. Rev. Francis 
Lodonu, (Bishop of Ho Diocese of the Catholic Church). The two groups were charged with the 
duty of finding an end to the boundary problem between the two communities and see to the 
immediate return of peace which for almost a century has become a scarce commodity (Ghana 
Web, 2007). While by 2006, significant progress had been made and seen in the support and 
commitment of both parties; the Mediation Committee was unable to achieve the much sought 
after peace like its predecessors. This is because of its inability to amass the trust and confidence 
of the parties to the conflict.  
 
                                                          
13 It was this committee that in need of expert advice employed the services of the West African Network for 
Peacebuilding (WANEP) led by Mr. Emmanuel Bombande to assist in the mediation process. 
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2.6.Land Tenure System and Conflicts in Ghana 
 
Many Sub- Saharan African countries rely extensively on land for their economic survival while 
concurrently, dealing with a myriad of land related challenges that revolve around a legal system 
that is divided between customs and statutes (Agbosu, 2000). The land tenure systems used 
today, have colonial underpinnings as they were instituted at a time when land was in profusion 
with less population (Boone, 2009). In Ghana, like most of its sister nations, land remains the 
most valued asset and accordingly serves as the foundation of Ghana’s economy (National Land 
Policy, 1999).  
 
Land in Ghana is principally administered by both customary practices and enacted legislations. 
Two basic land ownership patterns can be seen in Ghana: the state and private ownership.  State 
ownership is acquired by the government through the use of suitable legislations conferred on the 
president of the Republic and held in trust for the entire Ghanaian citizenry. Private ownerships 
on the other hand are seen in communal proprietorship also held in trust by traditional ruling 
bodies or family and clan heads for their members. Another form is seen in a joint partnership 
between the state and the private/traditional authorities (National Land Policy, 1999). Seventy 
eight percent (78%) of all the lands in Ghana are vested under traditional land proprietorship. 
The state also comes next with twenty percent (20%) with the remaining two percent (2%) being 
owned jointly by both the traditional authorities and the state. Land ownership and usage rights 
under this administration are therefore based on the legitimate recognition of the community and 
its leaders and are mostly undocumented. (Bower, 1993). This kind of ownership according to 
Quedraogo, Gwisei, and Hitimana (2006) have over the years been made manifest in continuous 
settlements, gains through wars of conquest, purchases among many others. And while different 
systems exist in different parts of the country, Larbi (2008) contend that they have been pliable 
over the years and have sustained agricultural and farming systems.  
 
Today, much of Southern Ghana in particular is still battling with prolonged tensions and 
intervallic struggles over land whose ownership rests in the domains of the traditional authorities 
and dates back from as far as the indirect rule days (Boone, 2009). According to a report from 
the International Institute for Environment and Development (1999), some of these lands related 
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contestations are severe and appears to be on the rife due mainly to population increase, 
urbanization and its resultant competition and land paucity. To Tsikata and Seini (2004), the 
fight over land remains a key aspect of ethnic conflict in Ghana, especially so as the universal 
agreements on land tenure systems while already a subject to severe problems have been 
aggravated with land tenure diffidence which has had negative repercussions for national 
development. This trend is made manifest in the Nkonya and Alavanyo conflict where the land in 
dispute is primarily owned by the various individual families and jointly superintend by their 
respective paramount chiefs.  
 
2.7.Conclusion 
 
In their working paper, Identities, Inequalities and Conflict in Ghana, Tsikata and Seini (2004) 
take a critical look at some emerging identities and inequalities and their predispositions to 
endorsing instability as well as violent conflict. They take a retrospective glance at Ghana’s past 
bearing in mind the North South dichotomy and establish some common categories of conflicts. 
These include; Inter-ethnic and Intra-ethnic disputes, Religious Conflicts, police community 
violence, political violence as well as football violence. In this paper, they also take a holistic 
look at the Nkonya and Alavanyo, labelling it as an inter-ethnic conflict and tracing it from its 
fundamental roots and dynamics through to the various attempts at solving the conflict it. 
Yakohene (2012), proceeds on a similar tangent and narrows it in the light of the contribution 
made by the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) in providing a possible solution 
to the conflict in her work, Talking to the other: Peacemaking in the Alavanyo and Nkonya 
Conflict. Midodzi and Imoro (2011) also on their part articulate the significance of ADR as a 
mechanism in dealing with conflicts and particularly as used in the Nkonya and Alavanyo 
conflict in their seminar paper; Assessing the effectiveness of the alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism in the Alavanyo-Nkonya conflict in the Volta region of Ghana. 
 
These approaches by the above scholars are unique and excellent in looking into and dealing 
with the various phases of the conflict and the innumerable attempts at mitigating it while at the 
same time, providing enough understanding to the age long dispute. Tsikata and Seini’s paper 
could possibly pass for the first known academic paper on the case (a position they admit to in 
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their paper) and Yakohene borrowed extensively from it. However, none of them specifically 
tackles the issue of its persistence. This research therefore gives enough credence to these 
existing literature and proceeds with an attempt at establishing why the conflict has remained 
insoluble for ages; a part that has virtually not been tackled, at least from the point of view of the 
existing literature that has been reviewed in the course of this study.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.Introduction 
 
This section addresses the methodological framework within which the study was undertaken. In 
dealing with the Nkonya and Alavanyo conflict in the Volta Region of Ghana, the research relied 
extensively on both primary and secondary sources.  Under the primary source, special emphasis 
was placed on field work which was carried out at Nkonya in Ghana.  The choice of Nkonya 
among the two feuding communities was necessitated by constrains including resources 
availability, time, access, and language. More so, I believed that the concentration on Nkonya 
will enable me to deal thoroughly with the research questions in the light of the limitations 
available. Flexible semi structured interviews were conducted with the reason of enabling the 
respondent enough room to deal with the various subjects of discussion.  The study  among other 
things looked out for the historical developments in these two areas more especially from the 
perspective of the Nkonyas, attempted to ascertain the foundation(s) and undercurrents of the 
antagonism, the effects of the conflict, the various attempts at solving the conflict as well as the 
reasons for which the conflict has persisted to date. This chapter begins with the construction of 
the method used as well as its implementation strategies on the field and proceeds to look at 
other sources of information or data used for this study and end with some reflections from the 
field. 
 
3.2.Construction of the method  
 
At the very beginning of the research, data collection arose as a central issue. After careful 
considerations, I settled for an ethnographic approach. I had to settle on this method as against a 
purely quantitative approach or mixed because, I realized that the conflict under review is under 
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researched14, and since it is also ongoing and given the main idea of investigating the reasons 
why it has defied resolution, I believed it was appropriate not only to have a first-hand 
information from the people themselves but also to study and understand their way of life as 
well. The question then was what exactly does it mean to go for fieldwork or to use an 
ethnographic approach in collecting data for research?  
 
To Hobbs (2006), fieldwork refers to the act of engaging with the environments of people with 
the objective of learning their ways within close proximity. Reeves, Kuper, and Hodges (2008) 
also present ethnography as the study of social relations with the aim of providing understanding 
into people’s views, activities and their environments by gathering comprehensive interviews 
and observations. Ethnography, to Van Maanen (1988) is the transcribed depiction of culture. 
This means that culture and fieldwork go hand in hand to produce ethnography. He also posits 
that culture is the product of the activities and speeches of a given group and concludes that 
‘fieldwork is one answer-some say the best –to the question of how the understanding of others, 
close or distant, is achieved’ (Van Maanen, 1988, p. 2). To this end, he contends that the idea 
embodies both ‘living with and living like’ the people under study. He further posits that since 
fieldwork combines culture in the production of ethnography, a fieldworker must witness and 
most significantly translate his/her observation into writing especially so as culture is conveyed 
by both the activities and speeches of the group in question (Van Maanen 1988). This position 
does not differ from the position of Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) who contend that 
ethnography involves the researcher’s involvement in the everyday lives of people over a period 
of time, where he/she asks questions from targeted informants aimed at gathering data for their 
research. This means that ethnographers or fieldworkers not only visit the field and make 
interviews but also stay with the people, observe and also study their ways of life. This method 
furthers the understanding of researchers on the people under study as well as their ways of life. 
Such an approach helps to replicate the actual realities at stake in the area under scrutiny 
(Brounéus, 2011).   
                                                          
14 There are not enough research or academic information on the case under study. For example even at the Balm 
Library of the University of Ghana which is considered the best Library in the country and even in West Africa, 
there are only two books which features articles that points to the conflict. In recent times, the case has attracted a lot 
of ongoing research works, however, since most of them are ongoing, the results are not yet available. (Interview 
with Emmanuel Bombande on January, 2014). 
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3.3.Preparation for the field and Implementation of method 
 
In doing this research, I made a field trip to Nkonya-Tayi, Ghana to not only conduct in-depth 
interviews for my study but also to learn about the people’s culture and to familiarize myself 
with the environment. Having settled on what method to use, the next choice was to identify 
which approach best suits my purpose. While many approaches to fieldwork abound for usage 
within the circle of Peace Research, I recognized that the use of in-depth interviews, combined 
with participant observation will best serve my objective.   
 
Boyce and Neale (2006) have explained that in-depth interviewing is a qualitative approach to 
research that encompasses the making of rigorous conversations with a similar number of 
interviewee with the view of eliciting their viewpoints on specific issues, state or condition. They 
further argue that unlike other data gathering approaches like survey, in-depth interviews provide 
detailed information. Guion, Diehl and McDonald (2011) also posit that per its open ended 
nature and semi-structured format, in-depth interviews offer respondents enough room to speak 
on the themes and questions under discussion. Additionally, it gives researchers enough platform 
to ask further questions by keenly paying attention and reflecting upon the interviewees’ 
viewpoints. In the arena of Peace and Conflict Research, Brounéus (2011, p. 130) argues that this 
approach assists in gaining ‘deeper understanding of the process of war and peacebuilding both 
among elites and different groups of the population’. Such understanding, she further argues 
especially at the grassroots throws light on ‘the challenges, possibilities and risks of peace’. 
Brounéus also assert that in-depth interviews can be applied inductively to produce new 
hypotheses or theory or used deductively to examine whether a theory based on results from 
previous studies at the nationwide echelon is appropriate or relevant at the grassroots. Moreover, 
as against secondary sources, they expose the researcher to first-hand information on the topic 
under study, this way she writes, they assist in recognizing ‘what theories within peace research 
have missed’ (Brounéus, 2011, p. 131). In the end, since there is little research information on 
the case between Nknonya and Alavanyo, the choice was to go for an inductive approach with 
the view of producing new hypothesis on the case.  
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To Brounéus (2011), it is imperative to master the skills of listening and to adequately make 
background preparations before embarking on a trip for the interviews.  She further points out 
the significance of other secondary sources claiming among others that they offers enough 
understanding and helps formulate the core theme(s) around which the interviews on the field are 
built. She also argues that these secondary sources give background information which are 
complimented by the interview with its offer of current perspectives. More so she advocates that 
a fieldworker must be adequately prepared by identifying and planning how to tackle issues from 
access through to even the administration of the interviews and beyond.   
To this end, many articles and theoretical writings were consulted before setting off for the field 
in Ghana. Intense efforts were also made to identify possible gate keepers and other contact 
persons not only to navigate entry but also to provide assistance on the field.  Unfortunately, 
while I succeeded in getting a contact person on the field before setting off, the person though an 
Nkonya man did not come exactly from Nkonya-Tayi and also lived in the capital, Accra. For 
this reason, I had to go to the field with little or no idea of the terrain and with no support. This 
initial set back throws light on Hammersley and Atkinson’s (1995) position that researchers 
encounter problems in a bid to getting access to data. This emanates from the fact that while the 
researcher usually has little control in his/her new setting, the people might also have their own 
problems to deal with and thus leave them with little motivation to assist the researcher. They 
further argue that this problem is severe during the preliminary consultations to go into the field, 
and through the early days in the field and persists ‘to one degree or another, throughout the data 
collection process’ (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p. 54). My initial difficulty thus did not 
come as a surprise. The good thing is that when judged by the litmus test of Hammersley and 
Atkinson, my case was completely different as the initial difficulty did not persist throughout my 
stay but rather improved tremendously with time.  
Before leaving for Nkonya-Tayi, I had a short meeting with Lawyer Opoku, (my initial contact 
person and an attorney for the Nkonya people) in Accra, where he gave me a background 
knowledge of the conflict and the area. After our meeting he gave me directions to Nkonya. 
‘Take a car from Tema Station in Accra to Kpando and when you get to Kpando you can get a 
car to Nkonya’, he told me.  As soon as I got to Tema Station, I asked an orange seller who 
directed me to the Kpando Station. I quickly got my ticket and chose a front seat. As it was my 
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maiden visit to the region, I hoped that in choosing a front seat, I would be able to have a good 
view of the topography of the area. My initial observation was very interesting: almost all the 
passengers spoke Ewe15. It was not surprising as it was the most common dialect of the region, 
yet it sent an automatic signal that I was going to have serious language problem even before I 
get to Nkonya where the people speak Asante-Twi16 in addition to the local Guan dialect.  
However, this conclusion proved false as I later found in the course of the journey that majority 
of the people in the car spoke not only the Ewe language but also fluent English. After about two 
hours in the van, it was full with passengers and we set off at around 12:30 pm. My choice of 
seat paid dearly as I enjoyed every part of the journey, watching keening with interest anything 
that caught my interest and occasionally, asking the driver some questions. The splendour of the 
landscape was particularly remarkable. At exactly 4:30 pm, I was in Kpando. On the whole, the 
journey was quiet smooth in spite of the fact that a lot of potholes on the road at some places 
made the journey a bit exhausting. 
I quickly looked for a hotel to pass the night. The next day I went to see the District Chief 
Executive (DCE) of the Kpando District who acts as the representative of the government in the 
area to assess the nature of the situation in Nkonya and to ask for some assistance on the best 
way to get to Nkonya especially as Nkonya used to be directly under the Kpando District. 
Unfortunately the DCE together with the District Coordinating Director (DCD) were not 
available and it took a couple of days before I was given a hearing.  When I explained my 
mission to the secretary, she insisted that I see the DCD instead of the DCE. The DCD was clear, 
there was no way the district could be of any assistance to me. ‘The area in question is no longer 
under Kpando and if you need any information, the car station is not far from here, besides, it 
takes about thirty (30) minutes’ he told me.  
While still wondering how to get into the town without encountering any trouble, I remembered 
an old family friend James, who used to stay in one of the towns in Nkonya. As I was not too 
sure, I made a couple of checks and got to know that he was still in the area. I got his contact and 
called him. He was happy to hear from me after about fifteen years but cautioned that Tayi was 
                                                          
15 There are precisely ten regions in Ghana with each identifying themselves with a common language. The Ewe 
language is actively spoken in the Volta region where Nkonya and Alavanyo is located and some parts of Togo. 
16 Asante Twi is my native language and is the most dominant language spoken in the southern part of Ghana. 
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still not safe and therefore since he had friends in the area he would want to come and help me 
out. I left Kpando early enough the next day to meet him in Ahenkro17 (see picture 3.1. below).  
                
   
       Picture 3.1. A map of Ghana indicating the actual location of Nkonya. (Source of Map unknown). 
We met at exactly about 8:00 am and subsequently headed to the police station where I met the 
Chief Inspector who turned out to be my gatekeeper in the end. At the station, I gave the chief 
inspector a copy of an introductory letter I had with me and an ID card and had a lengthy 
discussion on my mission to the area. In the end he agreed not only to provide me with security 
but also to introduce me to the paramount chief and his sub chiefs as well as any other people 
who might be of assistance to my project. We quickly arranged for a taxi to take us (myself, the 
police and the other family contact) to Tayi as there was no official police vehicle to be used.  
Nkonya-Tayi is about 10 minutes from Ahenkro and does not lay along the main Nkonya road. 
Opposite the Nkonya Senior High School (NKOSEC) lays a junction that goes to Tayi. The road 
as at the time of my visit was not tarred and had been damaged by constant erosion that had 
created huge potholes which made it difficult for vehicles to ply. Instead, residents resort to the 
                                                          
17 Ahenkro is one of the Nkonya communities and the capital of the Biakoye District. It is also home to the 
paramount chief of the Nkonya people.  
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use of motor bikes or trekking. From NKOSEC junction, one can easily notice a huge mountain 
at the extreme end that goes as far as the eyes can go. Beneath the mountain lies Tayi and behind 
that same mountain lies the disputed land between Nkonya and Alavanyo. (See pictures 3.2. and 
3.3. below). 
 
 
Picture 3.2. A road to Nkonya Tayi (Taken during my field trip). 
 
 
       Picture 3.3. A road to Nkonya Tayi (Taken during my field trip). 
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Tayi was quiet and serene at the time we got there. This picture was completely antithetical to 
the stories I heard outside of the community. School children were still in school busy studying, 
the market which is at the heart of the town was also quiet with few market women18 while 
others mostly young women were busy fetching water from the only bore-hole in the town (see 
picture 3.4. below). We headed straight to the palace where messages were sent around to the 
Regent of the Tayi stool and his elders for them to meet. The meeting which was made up of 
about fifteen (15) people took about an hour where I was asked to introduce myself and present 
the mission of my visit. The Regent in turn introduced me to the leaders of the community 
present, notable among them were the Assembly Member for the area and the secretary to the 
Tayi Peace Council. Before the meeting ended, the Regent gave me his consent to stay and 
conduct my interviews but cautioned that I must first seek the approval of the paramount chief in 
Ahenkro. I took the contact of the Assemblyman and left with the police to see the paramount 
chief and later, the DCE at Ahenkro.  
 
 
Picture 3.4. A cross section of people fetching water from the only bore-hole in Nkonya-Tayi. (Taken during 
my field trip).  
                                                          
18 This was not unusual as in most farming communities’ in Ghana where people leave for their farm in the 
mornings and return mostly in the evenings.  
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The meetings in Ahenkro also turned out well. The DCE, though could not be of any help gave 
me a warm reception. The paramount chief, Nana Okoto Kofi III, together with his other elders 
were also happy to see me and subsequently gave their accent for me to stay and continue my 
research. At about 5:00 pm, the police officer prompted me of the curfew and the need to leave 
the area on time. Since the policeman and my other contact person lived in the same town 
(Nkonya-Wuropong), I left them in Ahenkro and took a taxi to Kpando19 where I stayed 
throughout the field trip. This was how I spent the first days of my field work. The police was 
ready to assist me throughout my stay but I felt that the place was peaceful and therefore such 
assistance was not necessary after the very first day. Again after the initial meetings, I could have 
identified potential respondents within a day or two, but I decided to spread the interviews in line 
with ethnographic studies to do much of the observations in between them.  This also throws 
light on Remenyi’s (2011, p. 3) position that observation presents itself as a better alternative to 
interviewing but should be used side by side with interviews as it is unable to ‘observe past 
events… or current intentions’. By observing therefore, I hoped to fill the gaps that the 
interviews could not fill with personal observations. 
For the sampling of prospective respondents to be interviewed, Nkonya- Tayi (one of the about 
21 Nkonya communities) was chosen. The reason being that, they are the ones directly affected 
by the ongoing conflict and particularly so as they, among all the Nkonya communities share a 
common boundary with the people of Alavanyo. Moreover since per the nature of land 
ownership in Ghana, various families in Nkonya-Tayi own parcels of land in the whole 
community and by extension the disputed area, I believed that they (Nkonya-Tayi residents) will 
best help my course.  On the whole, twelve (12) people were interviewed for the research; nine 
(9) out of the twelve were interviewed from Nkonya-Tayi, one (1) person specifically the 
paramount chief20 was interviewed at Nkonya Ahenkro while Lawyer Opoku, and Emmanuel 
Bombande (of WANEP) were both interviewed in Accra.  
                                                          
19 My choice of accommodation in Kpando was informed by various reasons including the security situation which 
had orchestrated for the imposition of a curfew in Nkonya and Alavanyo at the time of the study by the government 
of Ghana from 6am -6pm.  
20 Article 277 of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana identifies a chief as ‘a person, who, hailing from 
the appropriate family and lineage, has been validly nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, enskinned or 
installed as a chief or queen mother in accordance with the relevant customary law and usage.’  To Boafo Arthur 
(2006:152), a chief is ‘political and social power centre …in the area he rules and ipso facto a microcosm of 
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In choosing the twelve people, special considerations made included their experiences of the 
crisis under scrutiny and knowledge on not only the disputed land but also the entire region 
under consideration. Gender of respondents was particularly taken into account to give an all-
encompassing perspective of the situation on the ground. Five (5) out of the twelve people 
sampled for interview were women. The reason for the deficit in the number of females as 
against males could be a cultural trait or perhaps the patriarchal nature21 of the Ghanaian society 
as most women to this extend preferred their male counterparts to be interviewed instead.  
In practice however, I had very limited control over the choice of respondents as the 
assemblyman was very instrumental in the selection of respondents. Of the twelve people, six of 
them were my own input while the others were introduced to me by the Assemblyman. Even 
though, I questioned the choice of the Assemblyman, as to why for example A must be 
interviewed instead of B? He argued that per his knowledge of the people and the entire 
community, his chosen people will be those who will be able to not only share their experience 
but will also deal with the questions appropriately. This meant my data would be prone to some 
element of bias as I was unable to go beyond what I was told relative to the suggestion of 
respondents (See section 3.5. below for other forms of bias).  
Since the nature of interviews conducted is very crucial not only to the research but also the 
respondents and the interviewer’s reflective listening skills (Brounéus, 2011, p. 136), special 
efforts were made to create a conducive atmosphere for the respondents to feel comfortable and 
respected. In doing so, all the candidates were asked to make a choice of time and location for 
the interviews. Not surprisingly, with the exception of two people who were interviewed in their 
offices in Accra, the rest were all spoken to in the comfort of their homes. I usually went for the 
scheduled appointments about twenty (20) minutes to the actual time. This always accorded me 
the chance of to do much of observation and subsequent recordings in my field notes. Apart from 
the paramount chief who was interviewed in the presence of all his elders, the other respondents 
were interviewed alone. This not only ensured privacy but also boosted respondents’ confidence. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
authority who at times rivals the central government in legitimacy, recognition, and loyalty’. By extension, a 
paramount chief is someone who has the overriding responsibility to oversee various traditional areas headed by a 
chief.  
21 Aina (1998) posit that it is an arrangement of social stratification and distinction on the basis of sex, which 
accords material gains to men while concurrently placing severe limitations on the roles and responsibilities of 
females.  
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Exceptional emphases were placed on how to engage the interviewees in a bid to better my 
understanding of the information given and to stimulate the interviews. Reflective listening 
which Gordon (1970) argues involve in-depth listening to understand respondents’ feelings and 
views was in this regards embraced as I always had to go back over my understandings to 
confirm if what I heard was right or wrong and to ask for detailed information in areas of 
interest.  
 
Before each interview, pleasantries were exchanged and the purpose of the interview carefully 
explained to the people. Respondents were also given the opportunity to ask any questions 
pertaining to the interviews before it started. As ethics demanded, I sought and gained the 
approval of respondents to record the interviews. This offered smooth and flexible interview 
process as I did not have to interrupt respondents by asking them to repeat so I could get the 
actual message and write. Though the various interviews took varying degrees of time to 
complete, nonetheless on the average, I had about 45 minutes of interview time with each 
respondent. 
As I have indicated earlier, observation also formed a major component of my data collection. 
Tayi is a small community and therefore it is near impossible to go there without being noticed 
as an outsider but despite that, there were days I did more of observation and interactions as 
against in-depth interviews. While I admit that the company of the police gave me a massive 
recognition and authority, it must be emphasised that the initial presence of the police did not in 
any way influenced the data collected. The work of the police only legitimised me in the eyes of 
the town’s people only on the first day on the field.  
 
3.4. Other Sources of Data Collection 
 
In gathering data for this research, other primary source of data such as archival documents from 
the Ghana National Achieves which includes documented court rulings, letters both from 
traditional rulers of Nkonya and Alavanyo and governmental organisations, and other deeds of 
agreement from both Nkonya and Alavanyo citizens were also consulted.  
 
 32 
 
While Dulic (2011) has argued that secondary sources are perceived as less significant when put 
in light with primary documents, Johnson (2002) has contended that in peace research, in-depth 
interviews are hardly used alone; instead they are usually combined with other methods. Bryman 
(2001) also asserts that in researches where theoretical considerations will be made, secondary 
sources presents themselves as a probable candidate for the provision of alternative data and it is 
also cost effective. For this reason, secondary sources of information were also used to 
supplement the data taken from Nkonya-Tayi. These included relevant documents that have 
direct bearings on the conflict such as books, chapters of books, research materials, lectures 
notes, newspaper articles among many others. In doing so, Source Criticism which Dulic (2011, 
p. 36) claims establishes grounds ‘for identifying and evaluating authenticity, uncertainty and 
bias in sources, thereby improving the ability to increase the accuracy of the analysis’ was 
applied. For example while the Nkonyas constructed their identity and ownership of the land in 
dispute mostly around oral history and court judgments, I saw that it will be imperative to 
crosscheck the various facts to establish their authenticity and to also identify if they corroborate 
each other. How related for instance is a writer to the case in question among others for example 
were also double checked.  
 
3.5.Reflections 
 
On the whole, the field work trip that took roughly a month ended with some thought provoking 
reflections. Despite its advantageous track record, I found out that in-depth interviews are prone 
to some effects. One of the main pitfalls I confronted was its disposition towards bias resulting 
from issues relating to access, choice of target groups as well as specific informants. The fact 
that I did not have full control over the selection of my respondents in Nkonya-Tayi lends 
credence to this claim. 
 
Again, among the documents collected on the field, majority were legal documents which Dulic 
(2011) has argued are though very instrumental but nonetheless challenging in dealing with 
relative to local conflicts. Questions have been raised as to whether or not it is appropriate to 
even use judicial evidence at all for analysis considering the fact that validating the arguments in 
court is even a herculean task and particularly so because ‘the prosecution and the defence have 
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the task of arguing from a position of proving their point rather than exploring the matter without 
any preconceived idea’ (Dulic, 2011, p. 44). In this respect, it has been extremely difficult 
working with the various court rulings on the matter. 
 
Moreover, it is capital intensive and also requires a lot of experience from the fieldworker. The 
former comes from the huge amounts of money spent on the project:  from buying of flight ticket 
from Finland to Ghana and back, local or internal transportation to and from the various places 
notably Nkonya, University of Ghana campus, feeding, accommodation cost in Kpando as well 
as payment of compensations22 for respondents and drinks for oiling the wheels of customs. The 
latter also emanates from the fact that the trip represents my actual maiden trip for a research and 
I found out that the interviews I conducted improved significantly with time. 
While on the field, I kept at the back of my mind that I was a researcher whose aim was not to 
find out who has a legitimate claim to the land or not. However, I found myself caught up in that 
web on several occasions. This is because in constructing their case, the Nkonyas were prepared 
to push me towards that position. This affected my reflective position. There were times I got 
completely lost as I saw myself as an Nkonyan but for the greater part, I also recognised my part 
as a researcher. In the end I settled for a midway approach since that did not fuel any perception 
about my role as a researcher but rather precipitated cooperation from the people. 
I must confess however that I could have done more of theoretical readings to beef up the quality 
of my interviews than I did before leaving for Nkonya-Tayi. As a panacea for this I took the 
contact details of all my respondents and agreed to call on them if further information is needed.  
I also regret that I was unable to stay for a longer time on the field partly because of my 
academic schedule and also my financial limitation. That said, I contend that this research will be 
a valuable input to the existing literature on the case of Nkonya and Alavanyo in Ghana as it 
seeks to explore new paradigms in the conflict particularly in the area of its persistence.   
                                                          
22 While on the field I contemplated on the issue of compensation for the respondents especially people including the 
police officer who spent quality time out of their busy schedule to assist me in diverse ways on the field.  In the end 
I decided to give them for some money for their time and effort. While this was a personal choice and not 
mandatory, I however had to buy drinks for the chiefs and elders as custom demands. These drinks are used in 
pouring libation and asking for the blessings and protection of the ‘gods’ of the land. It is worth noting that while I 
did not give the people any reason to expect compensation of any form, the monetary compensations were given at 
the very end of my stay in the community and therefore had no influence on the information they gave out.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4. RESEARCH FINDINGS  
 
4.1.Introduction 
 
According to Akinyoade (2013), in scientific research, whichever comes first, being it theory or 
data is not necessary, what is indeed essential he argues is that the two must be present. In this 
regard, even though, the chapter is dedicated to the presentation of findings from Nkonya-Tayi, 
Ghana, the theoretical standpoint that underpins this study will first be presented; this will be 
followed by a presentation of the data from the field. In the end, attempts will be made at 
deconstructing the raw data herein presented relative to the existing theoretical literature 
reviewed as well as other related literature. This will enable me to see whether or not the findings 
give credence to the existing theoretical views or otherwise. The chapter will end with a 
summary of the findings.  
 
4.2.Theoretical perspectives  
 
Theory is very pivotal in empirical and analytic studies in peace and conflict research as an 
applied social science. It is therefore imperative that a theoretical standpoint that offers a 
framework to which the findings must be tied to is identified and delved into. In the Nkonya and 
Alavanyo case under review, the theoretical framework that supports this study is the Protracted 
Social Conflict Theory. In developing a conceptual argument based on the topic of my research, 
other theories that shed light on the content of the study will be critically looked at. This section 
is thus dedicated to elucidating these theories and concepts within which the antagonism between 
Nkonya and Alavanyo which has persisted is studied and examined. To be able to explain the 
ongoing conflict between these two communities, I paid special attention to the position of Azar 
who stands out as a front liner in the codification of what has become known as protracted social 
conflict theory in his book, Azar, E. (1990) The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts: 
Theory and Cases. But what exactly does Azar means by protracted social conflict (PSC) which 
he argues is very characteristic of conflicts in the developing world? Azar (1990) notes that  
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‘Protracted social conflicts occur when communities are deprived of satisfaction 
of their basic needs on the basis of the communal identity. However, the 
deprivation is the result of a complex causal chain involving the role of the state 
and the pattern of international linkages. Furthermore, initial conditions (colonial 
legacy, domestic historical setting, and the multi-communal nature of the society) 
play important roles in shaping the genesis of protracted social conflict’ (p. 12). 
Azar’s identifies three key stages that best describe PSC which ranges from Genesis, Process 
Dynamics and Outcomes Analysis.  
Under Genesis, Azar points that for a full appreciation of PSC, it is crucial to understand the very 
roots of his model in which he establishes a set of elements; ‘communal content, needs, 
governance and the role of the state, and the international linkages’ that are accountable for the 
conversion of ‘non-conflicting situation into conflicting ones’ (p. 7). He argues that the most 
substantial feature correlated to PSC is the communal component of a society. Azar believes that 
the more a society is made of different communal groups, the more likely it is for a protracted 
conflict to surface. The reason he posit sterns from colonialism and its divide and rule strategies 
that ended up integrating several groups together as a unit and vice versa without recourse to 
their differences and secondly the historical antecedent of wars of conquest among most groups 
(p. 7).  
Another element he stresses is the human need component. Azar’s position is that human beings 
and by extension their groups have basic needs which sustains their very existence. When groups 
are denied these basic needs as a result of scarcity for example, while others enjoy them in 
abundance, it is only natural that grievances which are often articulated communally will result. 
His contention is that the authorities’ inability to deal with such grievances often creates a niche 
for PSC.  He argues further that, these inherent scarcity of basic needs do not by themselves give 
rise to conflict but instead the means to satisfy them which is a function of social institution (pp. 
7-10).  
The third element is governance and the role of the state. At the core of this argument is the idea 
that modern states have the responsibility to intervene in the satisfaction of the basic human 
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needs among its population. Azar argues that in an ideal situation, a state is characterized by a 
rational and an impartial mode of government who endeavours to fulfil the basic needs of 
individuals regardless of group differences.  While this situation is uncommon, he points out that 
this sustain peaceful coexistence whereas states which are characterized by parochial and 
dictatorial governments turn to experience PSC. This is always so because, in such states, power 
is often centred in the hands of a central or few dominant groups who use the state as a platform 
to fulfil their interest to the disadvantage of other groups.  Related also to this is the role of other 
international systems (countries or organizations) which can make significant imprints either 
within the economic and or political as well as military circles (pp. 10-12). Thus PSC ensue 
when communities or groups are denied their basic human needs on grounds of their identity. 
This pattern of denial and its replicative effects between the deprived communities and states is 
what Azar has tried to establish as preconditions for the start of PSC. To Azar, the reality is that 
these do not start PSC, instead, he argues that the ability of these four preconditions to precipitate 
overt conflicts is largely dependent on three factors which he code name Process Dynamics and 
these include; communal action and strategy, state action and strategy and built in properties of 
conflict.   
Under Communal Action and Strategies, Azar (1990, pp. 12-14) notes that when structural and 
communication systems suffer a setback in a society which is characterized by suspicion among 
groups, PSC ensues. Often times, the triggers of PSC under such circumstances may be as trivial 
as an insult but such triviality in turn becomes a platform for the oppression of others. In such 
situations, he observes that the general recognition of individual oppressions metamorphose into 
a united objections which are often met with some form of control. In the end, this general 
concern will in effect push a particular group to devise strategies in defence of their interest 
thereby starting conflict. 
Azar also argues that the action and strategies of the state also have the potency of maintaining 
or controlling PSC. This however, he contends, will depend on the states’ ability to deal with 
general communal grievance and promote the satisfaction of the basic needs regardless of group 
differences. Azar contends that the winner takes all syndrome among diverse communal systems 
prevents such a stand and instead embraces coercive repression or instrumental co-option. He 
further points out that while coercive repression only at best encourages the use of equally 
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destructive responses from the victimized group, co-option responses which has the potency of  
alleviating communal complaints  has often time been tagged as a diversionary tactic. In most 
cases, states try to hold a conflict within its borders by endeavouring to serve as a link between 
the local actors and their peripheral support groups. However, when such control approaches do 
not work, the state pursues its own outside support. The prevailing dependency and client ties 
expedite the involvement of foreign powers which not only intensifies the pace of the conflict, 
but also makes it more protracted. The final process element which is, built in mechanisms of 
Conflict, deals with the effects of conflicts over time on the opinions some groups have and how 
they reflect on the behaviour of pugnacious entities (Azar, 1990, pp. 14-15).  
The results of such PSC he notes are incalculable. Unlike other forms of conflict, PSC do not 
always have defined starting and terminating points, there is always no clear cut winners as the 
disputants themselves become victimized in the course. Azar’s observation is that areas 
experiencing PSC find it extremely trying in the search for avenues for redressing their 
problems. The fear of being ostracized further reinforces the disputant parties’ association with 
foreign actors which in turn promote a sequence of reliance, hostilities and desolation. Azar 
presents four related outcomes of PSC: Deterioration of physical security, Institutional 
Deformity, Psychological Ossification, Increased Dependency and Cliency. 
1. Systems experiencing PSC always undergo worsen physical security as more lives and 
properties are lost through the continuous struggle. Developmental efforts are halted as 
states invest huge amounts of money that otherwise would have been used in the 
satisfaction of basic human needs into the provision of security.  
2.  State institutions are deformed or at best rendered ineffective. This leads to further 
disintegration of the social fabric crucifying every possibility of cooperative engagement 
and peace building.  
3. With the prolonged nature of the conflict, perceptions and attitudes become hardened, 
significant communication among conflicting parties is badly affected.  
4. This further deepens the reliance on external support. The various conditions from these 
external supporters in the end limit the control of groups over their own people (Azar, 
1990, pp. 15-17).  
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In this work, Azar clearly establishes what he means by PSC. He proceeds to give its basic 
characteristics ending on its effects on a given conflicting community and argues that solutions 
to such conflicts are difficult. What he does not come clear on is why and how they become 
endemic, however, the reasons for the insoluble nature appear somewhat embedded in the effects 
he presents. In the following pages, I will try a critical engagement with Azar’s work to see if it 
is consistent with the findings from the field or otherwise.  
 
4.3. Analysis and discussion of findings 
 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1995, p. 240) have described the use of ethnography as ‘inescapably 
a textual enterprise’ or perhaps more appropriately the conversion of ‘the field’ into ‘text’ (p. 
250). It is in the light of this standpoint that the findings, which is a combination of the field 
work experiences, observation and collected data are presented below. While the information 
gathered was mainly from my interviews, a substantial amount of time was also spent in 
observing. This is consistent with the position of Marshall and Rossman (1989, p. 79) that 
‘immersion in the setting allows the researcher to hear, see and begin to experience reality as the 
participants do’. In this regard, through observation, I was able to realize additional information 
which Patton (2002) argues has the capacity to describe not only the happenings unfolding at the 
research site, but also the people involved in that world as well as what they are saying as against 
the information giving during interview process.  
 
This brings to mind the question of which style of presentation is appropriate. To Van Maanen 
(1988), the most common ones include the realist form, confessional and impressionist tale. The 
realist form of ethnographic representation which he argues stands out as the most noticeable 
form places much premium on the object of study (culture) while the fieldworker ‘more or less 
disappears into the described world’ (p. 45). By taking such a position of anonymity, the end 
results produced gives an indication of ‘it’s not my perspective’ (fieldworker) ‘but theirs’ which 
somewhat ‘limits the focus of the tale’ (p. 64). The confessional tale also, while often perceived 
as a reaction to some of the attacks on the realists, act as complete antithesis to the realist tale 
that claim some form of moral uprightness. In this form of presentation, the fieldworker is 
pontificated, hence the use of the first person voice as against the use of the third person voice in 
 39 
 
the realist form. Confessional tales thus unveils the aura of secrecy around fieldwork by 
establishing in their account the shortcomings encountered in their ethnographic report (Van 
Maanen, 1988). Impressionist tales on the flip side combines the realist and the confessional tale. 
This evolution thus produces an outcome that combines the object of study with the author. In 
the light of this, attempts will be made in the subsequent presentation of findings in a way that as 
in the words of Van Maanen (1988, p. 102) produces ‘the doing of fieldwork rather than simply 
the doer or the done’.  
Looking back at the field, few points are worthy of note. Upon my arrival at Nkonya-Tayi23, the 
town was serene and quiet as with most farming communities in Ghana where farmers leave the 
town for their respective farms and will not be back until after sunset. While a taxi driver had 
refused to take me to Tayi from Kpando for reasons of his safety, I had a different encounter at 
Tayi. The town looked more peaceful than the false picture peddled by rumours. The irony of 
Christ Peaceful Church’s sign post (see picture 4.1 below) graciously gracing the entrance of a 
conflict prone area could not be missed. Many towns in the Volta Region have lessor gods 
moulded with mud and planted in front of houses, perhaps in affirmation of their believe in the 
traditional religious system. Surprisingly, this was missing in Nkonya; it could also be an 
indication of how different in terms of their ethnic and religious identities, the Nkonyas are from 
the rest of the people in the Volta Region. More striking and glaring was the impressive 
monument of a man with spear clasped in his hands, ready to strike a foe helplessly locked 
beneath his feet at the centre of the town (See picture 4.2 below). For days, I thought about the 
monuments and its significance until I finally broke the silence by asking a passer-by who told 
me it was the statue of St. Michael, the archangel planted in front of an Old Catholic church.  
 
                                                          
23 Nkonya is a community with 23 different villages or towns coming under its umbrella. Tayi is one of such 
communities. A greater number of interviews were taken from Tayi because they are, more than all the other 
Nkonya people, the most badly affected in the conflict as they share a common boundary with the Alavanyos and 
most of the lands in the disputed area belongs to individual families in Tayi. Nkonya-Tayi is therefore the same as 
Tayi while Nkonya on its own represents the entire Guan group in the area.  
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Picture 4.1 Picture of a church’s sign post in Nkonya Tayi (Taken during my field trip). 
 
 
     
       Picture 4.2 A statue of St. Michael in front of an old Catholic Church (Taken during my field trip). 
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Another point that caught my attention was the demographic structure of the Tayi. While, 
Nkonya-Tayi is a small town with building structures that look almost countable on both sides of 
the main street, I observed that the aged outnumbered the youth and the young adult. My 
suspicion was that it was possible the youth had travelled to the big cities in search of greener 
pastures and possibly for a peaceful life that has eluded them for years. More so, during my visits 
to the only school, I saw the classrooms were near empty, a case that reinforced my suspicion. 
This notion was later to be confirmed by a respondent during an interview session.  
 
Again, typical of most farming communities in Ghana, the Nkonyas also engage in petty trading 
of their farm products for survival no matter how small they may be. An inscription on a kiosk; 
‘DON’T GIVE SMALL MONEY CHANCE’ (see picture 4.3. below) perhaps best captures this 
position. Unfortunately however, the near emptiness of fresh food products mostly from people’s 
farms at the market painted a picture of extreme hardship resulting from the ongoing hostilities, a 
position that perhaps reveals that the residents have ‘given small money chance to fly’. Indeed, 
the market was near empty and quite, something which is also uncommon about market scenes in 
Ghana generally, regardless of how small the size is (see picture 4.4. below). It appears that the 
situation has thus encouraged backyard farming as a means of subsistence.  
 
Overall, the serenity of the environment at the time of my stay, coupled with the warm reception 
accorded me by the people gave me a lot of latitude in the execution of my work. As indicated, 
the study from which data is drawn aimed at examining the causes, the effects, the various 
attempts made at solving the conflict and most importantly why the conflict has persisted to date.  
In the section below, I will present the finding into two main broad categories. First, I will look 
at the causes and effects as well as the attempts made at solving the conflict. This will give a 
background knowledge to the conflict and help answer while for almost a century the conflict 
seems to have defied resolution in the second category.  
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Picture 4.3 A shop on the streets of Nkonya-Tayi (Picture taken during the field trip). 
 
 
      
      Picture 4.4 Market site at Nkonya-Tayi (Picture taken during the field trip).  
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4.4.  Causes, effects and the various attempts at solving the conflict 
 
Before going to the field, I prepared themes instead of direct questions for my respondents. This 
not only enabled me to effectively steer the interview process but also gave the respondents 
enough room to answer the questions that were posed to them. In most cases, the questions were 
follow up questions to what they have said or hinted while answering a different question. As a 
general pattern used throughout the interview process, I asked my respondents to tell me what 
they know about the conflict. All twelve respondents were unanimous in their accounts of the 
conflict with very little variations. Respondents started generally from the migration of their 
ancestors through to their present day location. This was followed by the latter sojourn of the 
Alavanyos who were upon their arrival given a safe haven from their original destination from 
where they were persecuted and eventually, how the disagreement over the land started and the 
ultimate results to date. I observed that the differences in the account had a lot to do with 
educational status of the respondents. While some of the respondents mostly women claimed not 
to be literate and therefore presented their stories from oral accounts and personal experiences, I 
found that the educated ones also aside from their experiences and oral evidences, also made 
references to documented materials and facts such as court judgments, and official letters 
communicated to them in relation to the land dispute. Moreover, respondents who were and or 
had been involved in the peace process in one way or the other were able to give more detailed 
information than those who were not or had never been involved in any of the peace process.  
The field work interview which was recorded and subsequently transcribed established a lot of 
revelations and insights into the conflict. At the core of the conflict, I gathered during my visit 
and subsequent interviews, was the question of land ownership and related border demarcation 
which featured prominently in the chronicles of respondents when asked about their knowledge 
on the conflict in general. When I turned up for my interview at the residence of Christian Y. E., 
the Regent of Tayi, I asked him after the usual pleasantries, ‘Can you please tell me what you 
know about the conflict? He took a deep breath and after a moment pause, here is what he said 
and it was based on his narrative that all follow up questions emerged for discussion.  
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‘The Nkonyas were the first to settle here long, long ago before the Ewes24 started 
coming. Then finally, the Alavanyos were the last to break away from Soviet25 to 
ask for a piece of land to settle with us here. We agreed and gave them the land. 
Before they came, we were sharing boundaries with Gbui, so when they came in, 
that part of our farm land was given to them. This included parts of Ahenkro, 
Ntwumuru as well as Asakyiri. Soon they started infiltrating into our lands and 
this resulted in a lot of skirmishes. So around 1913, the colonial German 
administration saw that there should be a demarcation among the six sister states 
consisting Nkonya, Alavanyo, Gbi, Santrokofi, Akpafu and Bowiri. The land was 
surveyed and each tribal head indicated their boundaries and this was 
documented. Every head of each state was given a copy of the map and since then 
there were no quarrels.  
Unfortunately, after sometimes, the Alavanyos started breaking the concrete 
pillars fixed by the colonial administration, claiming that what in their view was 
the true boundaries were the anyaa trees and that brought about the first civil war. 
That was in 1923. After the civil war, we settled down again. Not quite long, they 
started getting into the land again, so in 1931 the government acquired part of the 
mountains as forest reserve but the Alavanyos started going to the forest reserves 
to cut tree and make cocoa farms and that also brought a lot of problems.  
In the end there was the need to go to court for settlement. So in 1953 the matter 
was taken to Kpando Native Court B and later transferred to the Lands Court. So, 
that started the whole thing. There were series of court actions until 1975 when 
the final settlement came in. At that time, the boundary demarcated by the 
Germans had been accepted by all the six communities and all of us were asked to 
stick to the Grunner boundary. Then, the ownership of the land was determined 
that the land belonged to the Nkonya citizens. There was an injunction order also 
that no citizen of Alavanyo should cross the boundary into the land again. So the 
paramount chief of Alavanyo at the time Togbe Anku Atakora also accepted and 
                                                          
24 The Ewes are the dominant ethnic group in the Volta Region and they are made up of various groups which 
include the Alavanyos.  
25 Pronounced ‘Sovie’, Soviet is a name of a town in the Volta Region. 
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he was even given land to farm on. But in 1983, he was overthrown by the youth 
who argued they were going to forcefully take over the land. A new chief was 
enstooled by name Togbui Tsedze Atakora. His army then went into the land and 
killed all the Nkonya settlers. And that brought about another civil war.  
In fact this pattern of warfare has been continuing every four or five years until 
last year January (2013), when some of our hunters were attacked; they were shot, 
and then brought home by the youth who sent them to the hospital, luckily, they 
survived. Then in February, two other people were attacked. They were shot and 
killed. One was even beheaded. Then finally in April, I think that was 4th April, a 
young man who had gone to the farm to bring foodstuff with the wife was shot on 
top of these mountains (pointing to the disputed area). The wife managed to run 
for her life. She reported the incident and the young men were sent to the forest to 
bring the body. He was later sent to the hospital but he died even before getting 
there. All these things were reported to the police but no concrete action was 
taken. Then, just one day they also complained that somebody had shot a man at 
Alavanyo. Since they were attacking us, we also retaliated. This went on for two 
days until the police intervened. Now the president of the republic visited us and 
said the matter will be looked into. The Regional Minister and the Regional 
Commander, all have been visiting us. So that is how far we have come. We are 
waiting to hear from the government for the matter to be gone into.’26 
His narrative above confirms the significance of the land in the conflict under review. A strong 
case for the land as the primary cause of the conflict was also made by Mary D. while presenting 
her side of the story. She told me ‘the conflict is about land, and I have also been badly affected. 
Our great grandfathers were here before the Alavanyos came but later they rebelled against us27’ 
Amoah H. on her part also endorsed this perspective when she told me; 
‘I can’t tell what exactly brings the conflict. We have not done anything. It has 
always been the case that the Alavanyos have an eye on our land especially 
                                                          
26 Interview Conducted with Christian Y. E. at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in English).  
27 Interview Conducted with Mary D. at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in Twi). 
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behind the mountains. The point is that we are now the landlords and I believe 
that if there is not enough for them, they should simply ask us for it.’28 
 
Ben K’s viewpoint was not different from Christian, Mary, Hellen and indeed the rest of the 
respondents. As an opinion leader who has lived all his life in the community, he has been part of 
all proceedings that has to do with the conflict. In telling his side of the story, he blends the oral 
narrative with his personal experiences and involvement stressing much on the hitherto peaceful 
relations with the Alavanyos that has turned sour. As a follow up question, I politely interrupted 
him and asked; 
 
Me: This sounds like a good relationship. What changed? Why did the conflict 
start in the first place? 
Ben K: ‘The land and of course the agreement as to what really constitute the 
original boundary between Nkonya and Alavanyo changed and for a long while, 
we have been fighting for what we believe rightly belong to us.’29 
 
While the land appeared to have been the main issue under contention, other factors served as 
immediate triggers for the outbreak of hostilities at certain times. A classic example was the 
struggle over water which triggered an outbreak in 1983. Apart from the actual beginnings which 
most of the people never witnessed, the 1983 outbreak was witnessed by all the respondents with 
the exception of Mr Bombande and Lawyer Opoku. I realized that unlike the colonial 
antecedents of the conflict that had been mostly narrated verbally from generation to generation, 
they spoke about this particular one with much certainty and precision. Recounting the incident 
that led to the outbreak, Nana Okoto Kofi III, the paramount chief of the entire Nkonya lands had 
this to say; 
‘It was a dry season and the people of Nkonya fetched water close to the 
Alavanyos. The river was called Gyenana. As always because of the nature of the 
flow, people had to fetch in turns. Eye witnesses said that when it got to the turn 
of an Nkonya man from Nkonya-Ntwumuru to fetch, an Alavanyo lady refused to 
                                                          
28 Interview Conducted with Amoah H. at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in Twi). 
29 Interview Conducted with Ben K. at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in English). 
 47 
 
allow him to fetch and instead threw his bucket away. This resulted in a fight.  So 
the lady was beaten by the Nkonya man and she had to run to report to the chief 
and then later to the police. We went to settle the issue but unknown to us, the 
Alavanyos had planned to retaliate. They went to Kwetoi and attacked and killed 
the villagers including the Ashantis30 there. Afterwards they turned to our forest, 
killed our people and looted all our products including our cocoa and cola 
farms.’31 
 
Similar perspectives were given by all respondents. For example, narrating her side of the story, 
Broni D. spoke of her personal experience on the eve of the 1983 outbreak. 
‘I can say I know a lot about this case because my farm was just behind the 
mountains in 1983 and we lived there. That night, we were ordered by the chief 
through an emissary as early as 1:00 am to come home because of a potential 
outbreak of hostilities. Some of us headed the call and came home that dawn. The 
next morning, we woke only to be greeted by horrible news. The other villagers 
who had little children and couldn’t make the journey in the night had been 
ambushed and killed by the Alavanyos on their way home.’32 
 
On the question of whether or not their ethnic identities have been a potential cause of the 
conflict, I hand two unparalleled views among all the respondents. While a section of 
respondents believed ethnicity is as an issue of much significance in the conflict, others simply 
rubbished it. Here is what Bombande had to say: 
‘To the extent that the Nkonyas and Alavanyos are different ethnic groups I will 
argue that it is an inter-ethnic conflict. But then the conflict is not because they 
                                                          
30Ashantis also known as Asantes in different literature are members of the Ashanti Kingdom now reduced to a 
region, the Ashanti Region, in southern Ghana. They form part of the biggest ethnic group called the Akan. By far, 
the Ashanti language, the Asante Twi, is the most widely spoken language in the country. It is also worth 
mentioning that the Nkonyas apart from their own dialect are able to speak and communicate fluently in it in the 
Asante Twi. It is also a common knowledge that the Ewes (the larger group which includes Alavanyos) have been 
perceived as political archrivals of the Ashantis in history especially after the 1966 Coup.  
31 Interview Conducted with Nana Okoto Kofi III at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in Twi). 
32 Interview Conducted with Broni D. at Nkonya-Tayi (Conducted in Twi). 
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are different ethnic groups, they are different ethnic groups in which they define 
themselves as different but the reasons for the conflict go beyond their different 
ethnicities. It goes to power relationships, it goes to who is who, it goes to 
ownership of land which translates to we are more superior. Alavanyos see 
themselves to be defined by Nkonyas as less superior because they do not own 
land. And Nkonyas see themselves as more superior because they own the land 
and therefore are the landlords and so Alavanyos must obey their instructions. So 
it now goes beyond their different ethnicities into other categories of the social 
dimensions.’33 
 
William K, gave a similar view. He, like many others believe that ethnicity has come to take a 
centre stage of the conflict. To him, the threats on their lives have been translated into an ethnic 
solidarity that is precipitating outbreaks every now and then. He told me 
‘This (ethnicity) has been a major problem. Almost all the Ewes are now 
supporting the Alavanyos and there have been many threats to exterminate all of 
us. Even previously, the conflict was limited to only Nkonya-Tayi but as we 
speak the conflict has been extended to the entire Nkonya people.’34 
 
Nana Okoto Kofi III, however, had an antithetical position. He was very clear and passionate on 
the question of their ethnic differences when he said, ‘I don’t believe that our ethnic difference is 
responsible for this whole conflict.’35 Amoah H. also gives a similar position when she says; 
‘Well to the extent that we have lived before as one people, trading partners and 
have most importantly intermarried ourselves, I do not think that being a Guan 
(Nkonya) or a Voltarian (Alavanyo) is a big deal in this conflict.’36  
Touching on how the conflict has affected them, all respondents including the lawyer agreed 
largely that the conflict has been devastating on their lives in diverse ways. A strong case of the 
                                                          
33  Interview Conducted with Bombande E. at Accra (Conducted in English). 
34  Interview Conducted with William K. at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in English).  
35 Interview Conducted with Nana O. K. III at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in Twi).  
36 Interview Conducted with Amoah H. at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in Twi). 
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effects was put forward by William K. when I asked him, In the face of all these, how has this 
conflict affected you? He told to me; 
‘The problems the conflict has brought on us are many. Because of fear, our 
people especially those whose land happens to be on the mountains and behind 
cannot go to farm again. All our cocoa and cola farms have been left in the bush 
unattended to for years. This has caused food problems and money issues. We just 
can’t go to farm for food because of fear. Our children cannot also go to school 
because we cannot pay their school fees. My brother, as I speak to you, this 
conflict has brought to our communities some social menace. Some of the ladies 
are engaging in prostitution both here and in the cities like Accra for money. The 
men are also stealing and this is causing problem even among ourselves here.’37 
Alice O. also told me; 
‘Our people are peasant farmers and since the conflict has made it difficult or 
impossible for people to go over to their lands and work on their farm, the 
resulting consequence has been poverty and hunger that we have endured over the 
years. My land is locked up there and personally, I have had to suffer serious 
hardships for many years. I don’t think I will ever forget the families I have lost to 
this land matter.’38 
On that note of the effects the conflict has had, I proceeded to ask respondents on the various 
attempts made at saving them from the inherent troubles they have had to endure in the face on 
the conflict. The cross section of respondents, acknowledged that there have been many attempts 
at solving the conflict although they have yielded very limited dividend. What differed in their 
presentation was the depth of their knowledge which was informed mostly by educational levels 
and their involvements in the processes. Telling me about the various interventions, Christian Y. 
E. said; 
‘The court has been at the forefront in the settlement of this dispute right from the 
1950s through to the highest court which was the Appeals Court in 1975 where 
                                                          
37 Interview Conducted with William K. at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in English). 
38 Interview Conducted with Alice O. at Nkonya-Tayi (Conducted in Twi). 
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the ownership of the land was determined. Many Committee like the Mireku 
Committees were also formed in the past to assist us look into the matter and of 
course as always government employs police and military teams to help maintain 
law and order.’39 
Kwadwo T. in a similar vein also indicated that;  
‘A lot of entities have attempted to help. The governments have come in over the 
years, the peace Council has come in, the non-governmental organisations like the 
WANEP, the District Security Council (DISEC), the Regional Security Council 
(RESEC) have also come in on several occasions and in recent times even the 
National Security had to come in  and the head of state himself came down to 
Nkonya. Our sons in the diaspora especially in the Americas have also been very 
instrumental.’40 
William K also on his part gave a tall list of the attempts made by governments, civil society and 
cooperate bodies at solving the conflict ending on a note of scepticism. He told me; 
‘My brother a lot of the assistance come all the time. I cannot remember all of 
them but I will tell you the ones l remember and even the ones I don’t remember, 
I will give you all the documents to go through. I remember the Acquah 
Committee which was set up in 1992 but even before they could commence work, 
the Alavanyos brought the fight again. Then there was the Mireku Committee but 
we did not accepts their result. They wanted the government to take the land and 
we did not agree. Even the government knows this is not possible.  
In 2006 there was another Mediation Committee put in place to settle this conflict. 
We were taught how to negotiate and what brings about peace. We were also 
made to cut our boundary lines. Unfortunately the Alavanyos extended theirs ten 
miles square into our area. In the course of time, we were asked to bring our 
proposals. And the Alavanyos proposed we demarcate the so called disputed area 
into two or the government should take over. Our proposal was to go for the 
                                                          
39 Interview Conducted with Christian Y. E. at Nkonya-Tayi (Conducted in English). 
40 Interview Conducted with Kwadwo T. at Nkonya-Tayi (Conducted in English).  
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Grunner demarcations and court rulings. It was there that we were told by Mr 
Bombabde ‘not to be slaves to court rulings and maps’. I made reference to 
Solomon’s famous judgment in the bible about the dead and the living child and it 
was there that Rev. Livingston Boamah retorted that ‘Look at the way they talk 
like peasant farmers brought to the church to sing’. So instead of leaving the 
Nkonyas and Alavanyos to negotiate, the two of us ended up struggling with the 
mediators. It was at that time that the paramount chief called for a break to confer 
with his people and to see whether we want to agree with the sharing of the 
overlapping area. But here the decision was that the Nkonya communities are 
many and the lands are owned by individuals and therefore it was not possible to 
give out individual people’s land as they cannot get a place to farm. We also saw 
that the committee was bias in favour of Alavanyos so we pulled out of it. In fact 
there have been several committee’s I cannot readily remember.’41 
A significant outcome of the findings was that all twelve (12) participants unanimously agreed in 
principle that the land issue has remained the single most important cause of the conflict between 
Nkonya and Alavanyo. The passion with which almost all the respondents presented their case 
indicated the significance of land in their livelihoods. This however does not come as a shock as 
land still remains the most prized asset and accordingly serves as the foundation of the nation’s 
economy (National Land Policy, 1999). The impact of the land on the conflict is made manifest 
in the various legal tussles between the two disputing communities where the writ field in each 
of the cases from 1953 up until 1975 had centred on the land and related activities on it.  
Looking at the land issue through the lens of the communal component theorised by Azar (1990), 
calls for questioning and debate.  His basic position has been that, societies made up of multiple 
communities are likely to experience PSC. This, he argues is a direct result of diverse differences 
usually brought together either through colonialism or the historical pattern of warfare among 
various group. While the colonial history can be blame to a greater extend for the closeness of 
the two societies42 and by extension the land dispute, it is still difficult to holistically accept this 
                                                          
41 Interview Conducted with William K. at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in English). 
42 See the causes of the conflict from the literature review section for the historical connection. 
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claim as true without critical scrutiny, as many groups have existed peacefully for ages without 
conflict in spite of the fact that their commonalities were created by colonial legacies.  
This relates to the question of ethnicity which cannot be simply overlooked. So far, two 
contending views exist. While one places the blame of the conflict at the door step of their ethnic 
difference, the other standpoint disagrees with this position, claiming instead that there is very 
little or at best no correlation between their ethnic differences and the conflict as a whole. 
Although this insight was gained from interviews, I realised from my various observations that 
indeed their ethnic difference has a centre seat in the discordant relationship. The strong 
distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ which was very pronounced in their daily conversation was 
indicative of this point. Thus while cultural distinctions are not clearly spelt out or easily 
observable in the daily lives of the Nkonyas, it is worth pointing out that this positions is 
consistent with Barth’s (1969) ethnic composition which he argues is based on ascriptions and 
self-ascriptions instead rather than cultural embodiments.  Azar’s (1990) communal content is 
true in the case under review especially when viewed from the colonial past of Ghana. Such a 
multicommunal standpoint has been endorsed by Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) who 
argue that contrary to Marx’ prediction that class struggle would change the world in the 
twentieth century, it turned out to be a period of ethno-nationalist conflict. However, it appears 
that his model stands challenged particularly when viewed from the angle of others like William 
(2011) who points out that the association between ethnicity and conflict is an unsustainable 
perspective, arguing instead that giving the ethnic diversity across the globe, the entire world 
would have been engulfed by interminable conflict. More so, is the fact that even people of the 
same homogeneous ethnic groups have fought among themselves for ages. A typical example in 
this case is the Hmong communities in Australia and Thailand. Regardless of how one sees the 
role of ethnicity in the Nkonya and Alavanyo case, what is conspicuous is that while the conflict 
might not have been sparked by the ethnic differences, it does seem that their differences have 
now become a fault line through which the conflict is been fought. 
Since the land question and by default all other related activities can be equated to a clear case of 
survival, we see Azar’s model of human needs component here in the conflict. His arguments are 
that, ‘individual survival is contingent upon the satisfaction of material need’ (1990, p. 7). He 
further argues that since these basic needs are usually ‘seldom evenly or justly met’ as a result of 
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scarcity, there is always a tendency of one group to enjoy their satisfaction in excess to the 
neglect of the other groups. This intend creates an avenue for grievances to be nursed by the 
disadvantaged groups and ultimately provides grounds for PSC (Azar, 1990, p. 7). Such needs 
Azar (1991, p. 93) argues include but not limited to ‘security, recognition and acceptance, fair 
access to political institutions and economic participation’. Thus, since the setting under review 
is a farming community whose population rely solely on subsistent farming and any other related 
activities like hunting and charcoal burning for their livelihood, any attempt at disadvantaging 
any of them is seen as an attempt to deny them of their livelihood and by extension their very 
existence.  
Azar (1990) also notes the governance and the role of the state has a pivotal factor in causing 
PSC. His arguments are that, the state’s ability to help its citizenry to meet their basic human 
needs or not go a long way to either spark or contain a conflict. Azar contends that the states 
inability to deal with the issue of basic needs of its people further exacerbate already existing 
conflicting situations. This goes further to throw light on the argument that governments have the 
capacity to guarantee social stability through the provision of mechanisms like social welfare 
payments which usually ‘buy off’ rebellions (Regan & Frank, 2012, p. 502). However, given the 
nature of the conflict and the nature of the governance structure especially over land, it will not 
be a fallacy to conclude that the state does not have the capacity to safeguard the situation by 
making land available to its citizens who need them as it owns only 20% of the 238,533 square 
kilometres of the total land size of Ghana. Using Azar’s point as a model, it could thus been seen 
that the state has not been able to make enough land available for the people of Nkonya and 
Alavanyo and hence the conflict. A position that the state certainly has very little control due 
mainly to its land tenure system. More important is the fact that most people feel they do not 
have enough security and protection from the state and hence the idea of massing up in defence 
of their personal security. It is worth noting that while the state is incapacitated in the provision 
of needs like land, it has over the years provided other needs like security, at least according to 
the narratives of the respondents. However, the growing fear that William K alludes to when he 
talks of the effects the conflict has had on them lends credence to the fact that the attempts by the 
government is yet to be felt by the people. 
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To Azar (1990, p. 12), any of these components (communal content and human needs, and 
governance and the state’s role) which he calls preconditions for the rise of PSC do not in 
themselves lead to ‘an overt or manifest conflict’ instead they stay dormant until triggered by 
other factors mostly trivial. In this regard, the activities of humans or in this case the people of 
Nkonya and Alavanyo relative to the land are responsible for the conflict. A classic example of 
this human activities which Azar codenames communal actions and strategies that act in 
themselves as triggers can be equated to the water crisis in 1983 which caused the conflict to 
escalate at the time. Other related activities that can also be seen in this light has to do with 
illegal works such as farming, mining and lumbering on the disputed land which have over the 
years sparked escalation of tensions with resultant loss of lives and properties. For instance, an 
Nkonya chronicle contends that while the land has been a serious point of disagreement before 
1913, the first indication of violence exploded at the back of a dispute between two individual 
residents of Nkonya-Tayi and Alavanyo-Kpeme over a piece of land within the now disputed site 
(Yakohene, 2012).  And more recently, the patches of deadly attacks that were experienced by 
Nkonya citizens in the period leading up to the violent clashes in 2012 that ultimately sparked 
the current hostilities which were recounted by various respondents could also be seen in this 
light. More prominent is the fact that these acts of violence are usually orchestrated by 
individuals but end up becoming a communal problem, a point Azar was very clear on. 
Again, Azar (1990) also notes that the actions and strategies of the state which is usually evident 
in its response to most communal grievances can be a possible trigger of the conflict. These 
reactions are mostly one of coercive repressions or co-option to avoid any sign of weakness. In 
the Nkonya and Alavanyo case, the state has not used any form of militant or harsh response 
which correspondingly ‘invites equally militant responses from repressed groups’ but instead co-
option measures in the form of the various interventions which ‘serve to mitigate communal 
grievances’ has been used. It worth pointing out that the ‘failure of these co-option strategies 
further justifies coercive repressive options, leading to an upward spiral of violent clashes’ (p. 
14). Thus the people of Nkonya in their own view continue to fight because they do not feel safe 
and secured in their own territory and therefore does so in self-defence. While I did not witness 
any hostilities during my stay, some residents of Nkonya in private conversations also indicated 
how they have personally fought in the past in defence of their own interests or that of their 
relations. The overall effect which Azar calls built in mechanisms of conflict is seen in the 
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perceptions the Nkonyas have on the Alavanyos. The Nkonyas see the Alavanyos as trouble 
makers who cannot be trusted. This in turn reflects in their interactions to date which has become 
sour. Azar indicates that in such a situation of ‘proscribed interactions, the worst motivations 
tend to be attributed to the other side’ (Azar, 1990, p. 15), one of the main reasons perhaps why 
such communal antagonisms have been difficult to deal with. 
From the point of view of the respondents, it is clear that the conflict has not come without a 
cost. With a general air of fear surrounding the communities, the Nkonyas claim they have had to 
cope with extreme poverty resulting from their inability to go about their normal farm works, 
social menaces like prostitution and robbery among others. It is important to establish that this 
fear is also precipitated by their lack of confidence in the security system. For while they 
recognize the existence of the military and police to a greater degree, I observed as I listened to 
both my respondents and other people from the village that they have no hope in their ability to 
guarantee them their security. This bears semblances to what Azar (1990, p. 16) called 
deterioration of physical security which he indicates ‘is the most obvious consequence, 
exacerbating initial conditions of insecurity through further loss of lives and means of support’.  
This is no doubt is also connected to his point of institutional deformity. Azar’s argument is that 
PSC have the strength of denting not only the social and economic but also the political 
institutions. His main contentions are that such degeneration in one breath weakens the central 
government and consequently its ability to perform their basic functions and on the other breath 
widen the communal cleavage, and affects the prospects of a cooperative interaction among the 
disputants (Azar, 1990). This is true to the extent that amidst the heavy presence of the military 
and police, the Nkonyas still feel unsecured. This insecurity has occasioned the loss of their 
livelihood. A position they claim has brought untold hardships to their people and further 
exacerbated by the state’s inability to take care of their basic needs.  It is in the face of these 
lucid disclosures of the difficulties they encounter on daily basis that have forced governments, 
civil society organizations, non-governmental bodies, opinion leaders among others to help in 
bringing an end to the almost a century conflict. However, from all indication, it does appear 
that, the more efforts are put into its resolution, the more entrenched the conflict becomes. Why? 
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4.5. Reasons for the persistence of the conflict 
 
Nkonya-Tayi residents chronicle their version around the legal battles they have won. Most of 
the people believe that as far as they are concerned, the Alavanyos are only trouble makers 
because, the land in contention has been ruled unequivocally in their favour. What they argue 
accounts for the persistence of the conflict therefore are the non-execution or the non-
enforcement of the courts’ judgements; a blame they place at the doorstep of government.  To 
William K., the conflict has become protracted because,  
‘The Alavanyos have refused to accept the rulings of the court and no one is 
saying anything to them. The government has all the judicial records and is not 
ready to come out with the truth. And to be honest with you, this current NDC 
government is made up of Ewes and the Alavanyos are also Ewes. So you see 
why they are not ready to come of out with the truth?’43 
Christian Y. E. also believes that ‘the conflict is still going on because the Alavanyos have 
refused to accept the court rulings.’44 Alice O. on her part also tells me  
‘My son, the Alavanyos simply do not respect the law, if they do, I am sure we 
will not be here today, all the same I blame the government for encouraging 
them.’45 
Lawyer Opoku however has a different viewpoint. While he agrees in principle on the issue of 
the non-execution of the courts’ verdict being responsible for the persistence of the conflict, he 
argues that the blame must be directed towards the Nkonya people for agreeing to originally 
harbour the Alavanyos through the signing of a tenancy agreement with them instead of 
implementing the rulings of the court. When I met him in his office in Accra after my trip to 
Nkonya, I asked him after he finished presenting his side of the story which was not different 
from what all the respondents have said in Tayi; 
                                                          
43 Interview Conducted with William K. at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in English).  
44 Interview Conducted with Christian Y. E. at Nkonya-Tayi (Conducted in English). 
45 Interview Conducted with Alice O. at Nkonya-Tayi (Conducted in Twi). 
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Me- The whole narrative has been built around this legal tussle and the evidence 
presented indicates that the court has consistently ruled in favour of the Nkonyas. 
The Nkonyas believe that the non-enforcement of the judgements are responsible 
for the protracted nature of the conflict? What do you think? Is this a view you 
share and who is responsible for the enforcement of the courts’ rulings?  
Lawyer O.-‘Let me start with the last part. You see, the one who won the verdict 
must execute the judgment. The state does not come in at all and that is why the 
Attorney General is never mentioned in any of the judgements. So if the judgment 
is executed, I agree there will be peace in the area. If you are going to court, the 
first process is to take your papers to court, and then the second process is to go 
through the trial stage and the third process is the execution stage. The execution 
stage is what is worrying and that is what I am working on. 
If you look at the last judgment by the highest court of the land, it talks about an 
injunction, if there is an injunction it means you are restrained from doing certain 
act, so if you continue to do those acts and the person who has won does not take 
in any steps to infatuate the tenets of the judgment then it goes unpunished. 
The execution stage for that purpose of injunction is first to bring the judgment to 
their attention through entry of judgment served on them and then after that if 
they flout in spite of the entry of judgment then you institute an action of 
contempt. So that if they had done the proper thing, after the Nkonyas had won, if 
they had done the proper thing, then it meant serving on them the entry of 
judgment and then subsequently if they flouted the injunction, then you go with 
contempt of court. If one, two, three of them were punished, for being in contempt 
of court for flouting an injunction order this whole issue will be settled. 
This was not done because the Nkonyas entered into an agreement with some of 
the Alavanyos for which they were to atone tenancy to the Nkonya people. After 
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they all died, I suppose their people did not understand why those things were 
done so they continued the trespassing.’46  
Linked to this is the lack of punitive measures or sanctions against people who violate the laws 
of the country. According to most of the respondents, this has however endorsed a culture of 
impunity as people who especially perpetuates acts of violence are left off the hook of the law 
without punishment. When asked about what in his own view has made the conflict protracted, 
Kwadwo T. pointed out that,  
‘…we have suffered from the hands of the Alavanyos for a very long time. The 
truth of the matter is that they openly defy court orders, enter our lands, cut down 
our timber, destroy our food crops and cocoa and yet walk freely afterwards. We 
know of many such persons who as still walking as free men today. My brother, 
with this kind of situation, why won’t people repeat wrong doings?’47 
Alice O. also states that;  
‘The Alavanyos know nothing can be done to them. In most cases suspects are not 
even arrested for questioning and when they do, nothing comes out of that. So 
they have taken advantage of the situation and are always making trouble.’48 
Abu G. also on her part, tells me, 
‘we know all the people behind this and we also know that they are all walking 
around as freemen after everything they put us through. After all, they know they 
can always escape from being punished.’49 
 In support of this stand Lawyer Opoku says the; 
‘Justice System must be effectuated for the laws to be respected and that is 
exactly what we are doing now. So that if you flout the orders of court, then is 
contempt of court. If you come before the court for contempt and you are 
                                                          
46 Interview Conducted with Lawyer Opoku at Accra (Conducted in English). 
47 Interview Conducted with Kwadwo T. at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in English). 
48 Interview Conducted with Alice O. at Nkonya-Tayi (Conducted in Twi). 
49 Interview Conducted with Abu G. at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in English). 
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imprisoned for even a day, next time people will respect the court’s decision and 
sanity will prevail.’50   
Another reason given for the intractability of the conflict is the defective nature of the conflict 
resolution efforts that have been practiced over the years. Speaking on the theme, Bombande 
indicated that; the conflict has persisted because, 
‘There has never been any mutual satisfaction. For peace to be durable, 
sustainable and genuine, the solutions must be mutually satisfactory to the parties 
of the conflict and that has not happened. Whether it was the high court ruling or 
the way the state has managed it, that has never happened. And so it will be 
hundred years and still counting, until the two parties satisfactorily are able to see 
that we have sat down and resolved this problem ourselves and that everybody 
now should support that, it will not work.’51 
 
Perhaps as an endorsement to Bombande’s position above, Ben K. says looking back, he thinks 
the various attempts have not been very effective. His only hope was the mediation committee 
that was formed in 2006 but even that one hardly changed his suspicion in the end. He tells me; 
‘All the interventions have been problematic in one way or the other. I think they 
have not really made any difference. To me, I think the most effective one of 
them all was the Mediation Committee. Unfortunately however, it looked as if its 
leaders were in support of the Alavanyos right from the beginning. They were not 
ready to delve into the historical records available so we Nkonyas backed out and 
nothing eventually came out of it.’52 
Nana Okoto Kofi’s position was not different from the standpoint of the other respondents. On 
his part, he told me during my interview with him, 
‘You know the mediation committee encouraged us to go and divide the land. So 
we took some time off to think about this whole process. I told them that I was not 
                                                          
50 Interview Conducted with Lawyer O. at Accra (Conducted in English). 
51 Interview Conducted with Bombande E. at Accra (Conducted in English).  
52 Interview Conducted with Ben K. at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in English).  
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ready to discuss what has already been ruled over by the court. In the end we had 
to pull out and never attended their meetings again simply because they were not 
ready to give us a fair hearing.’53 
Again, a cross section of the respondents also think that the conflict has defied resolution 
because of sheer greed. They argue among other things that the vast mineral resources on the 
land have been a strong factor motivating the Alavanyos to foment troubles. 
Mary D. thinks ‘is mere greed. There are a lot of resources to be enjoyed on the land and this has 
been difficult for them to simply let go.’54 
Abu G’s perception is also not different from that of Mary D. above. She says; 
‘…it is sheer jealousy and greed. They wish the land was theirs. Instead of them 
to come and ask us politely that their population has increased and that their land 
is no longer enough to sustain them, they are just applying force.’55 
Another factor has to do with the perceived elements of national party politics that they argue 
have made imprints in the conflict. The people of Nkonya are convinced beyond doubt that the 
current ruling NDC party is in favour of the Alavanyos and have hence turned a deaf ear to their 
plight. Speaking during our interview, Abu G says; 
‘I think we still have this problem because it is now the NDC government that is 
ruling. The majority of the Voltarian including the Alavanyos belong to that party 
and most of them are big men who always twist and turn issues around.’56 
I pushed further on this allegation especially when the national chairman of the NDC is an 
Nkonya man. So I asked, 
ME-‘How do you reconcile your allegation with the fact that the National 
Chairman of the NDC, Mr Kwabena Adjei, is a son of the Nkonya soil? 
                                                          
53 Interview Conducted with Nana O. K. at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in English).  
54 Interview Conducted with Mary D. at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in Twi). 
55 Interview Conducted with Abu G. at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in English).  
56 Interview Conducted with Abu G. at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in English). 
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Abu G. - He is just one man and is not doing anything for us as far as I am 
concerned.’57 
Answering a similar questions, after claiming also that the NDC is in support of the Alavanyos, 
William K was quick to say that; ‘he (Mr Kwabena Adjei) is only being remote controlled by the 
majority of the Ewes.’58 Lawyer Opoku also agree that there are some level of political 
involvement in the conflict. He is however quick to discredit it as a serious factor that has 
prolonged the conflict.  To him;  
‘There has always been politics in land matters but I don’t think it does take away 
the findings as it were. The proper thing was not done and that is why we are still 
where we are.’59 
From the findings above, the assertion that there can never be peace without justice especially in 
modern democracies is conspicuously established in the Nkonya chronicle. The notion of or 
perceived injustice sterns from the inability of the judicial system to deliver the much needed 
peace. The difficulty seems even more paramount when observed from the angle of the Bawku 
Conflict between the Kusaases and the Mamprusis in the Upper East Region of Ghana where in 
spite of the unanimous court victories of the Kusaases as the rightful owners of the land and for 
that matter the paramountcy, the conflict has protracted with lots of bloody offshoots60 (Noaga, 
2013a). Thus while the Nkonyas continue to hold on to these judgment, it appears that the 
Alavanyos have lucidly refused to accept their defeat and therefore the rulings in their eyes just 
like the Mamprusis case continue to be but just a piece of paper.  
In his letter to the then president of the Republic of Ghana, His Excellency, President Jerry 
Rawlings, dated 4th January, 1991, Togbe Anku Atakora V61 of Alavanyo also underscored the 
                                                          
57 Interview Conducted with Abu G. at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in English).  
58 Interview Conducted with William K. at Nkonya Tayi (Conducted in English).  
59 Interview Conducted with Lawyer Opoku at Accra (Conducted in English).  
60 See iinterview conducted with Bombande E. at Accra (Conducted in English). 
61 Togbe Anku Atakora V is the immediate past paramount chief of Alavanyo traditional area. He was beaten and 
subsequently destooled in the wake of the Alavanyo Nkonya crisis on April 7th, 1983 for selling ammunitions to the 
Nkonya people, harbouring of Nkonya people in his room,  the fact that his mother is an Nkonya woman and lastly, 
ultimately deserting his people in times of crisis.  
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position of the Nkonya people adding that the government must get involved to safeguard the 
much sought after peace. He stated categorically that, 
‘The Government should be bold and tell the Alavanyo who are always hostile 
and aggressive to withdraw from the disputed area at Kpeyime and allow the 
owners of the land, the people of Nkonya to work on their farms in peace. 
Alavanyo has lost his claim over the land, up to Appeal Court level. Tell 
Alavanyo to accept and obey the Rulings and the Order of the Court in good 
spirit. This and this alone will bring peace in the area and restore relations 
between Alavanyo and Nkonya.’ (See appendix ‘A’ for the full letter) 
Given this background it does appear simple but the reality is far from simple. The big question 
then remains whether the execution of judgments of the courts will be enough to end the conflict 
as Lawyer Opoku puts it. Tongeren (2011, p. 47) posits that of the twenty three (23) major 
conflicts documented in the northern part of Ghana between 1980 and 2002, most of them 
seemed ‘intractable in part because the justice system was not functioning at full capacity and 
many judicial cases remained unaddressed’, a position that reinforces the writer’s claim that 
‘most violent conflicts in Ghana broke out because the central government did not deliver 
justice’ (Tongeren (2011, p. 46). In clear terms, Meernik (2005) has indicated that the absence of 
the provision of justice, push people into pursuing less peaceful ways of achieving their aims. 
Vallacher, Coleman, Nowak, and Bui-Wrzosinska (2010) argue on their part that the issue of 
justice is essential to interpersonal and intergroup associations as it has the prospect of promoting 
social norm and helping to regulate behaviours of even disputants. Their contention is that it can 
become problematic especially as justice is often seen in subjective terms. This subjectivity can 
serve to intensify rather than mitigate conflict under some circumstances. They argue that 
unequal division of resources not only precipitates but sustains conflict when the conflict is 
outlined in terms of justice by the conflicting parties.  To them the disadvantaged parties view 
themselves as victims and sees their opponents as unfair and this serves to give meaning to their 
possible aggressive acts. The victors on the flipside are also likely to look down on the 
underprivileged party and invariably see themselves as superior by virtue of their access to 
resources. Thus in the end, both groups tend to subscribe to a notion of justice but from different 
angles (Vallacher et al., 2010). 
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The analysis by Vallacher et al. (2010) above paints a vivid picture of the conflict under study. 
Thus the judgments from various courts in favour of the Nkonyas and their subsequent cling onto 
them only seek to legitimize the so called aggressive actions of the Alavanyo who obviously 
might view themselves as having been victimized by the courts decisions. For example, in a 
ruling on 5th May, 1970, which was represented by Nana Kwabina Agya Atta (plaintiff) and 
Aaron T. Kuma of Alavanyo Kpeme (defendant), the Judge, Justice G.R. Mcvane Francois ruled 
in favour of the Nkonya. He noted among other things that the Alavanyos’ claim to the land had 
no basis and invariably established the authenticity of the Grunner map. He pointed out relative 
to their claim to the disputed area that; 
‘The impression one is left with, is a strenuous bid by the defendants to discredit 
once more the Grunner plan of 1913. I regret this third throw of the dice cannot 
yield the necessary bonanza. On the first issue therefore, namely the line of the 
boundary, between the Nkonya and the Alavanyos, no difficulty to a solution is 
posed. The plan of Mr. Hagan Exhibit ‘F’ showing clearly the 1913 Grunner line 
as also the transcript of Mr. Hagan’s evidence which was put in by consent as 
Exhibit ‘J’ put the issue beyond the periphery of dispute’ (Judgment,1970, p17; 
see also appendix ‘D’ for transcript of the full judgement). 
The above judgment and the subsequent persistence of the conflict suggests to a greater extent 
the ineffectiveness of the court to deliver peace in such a situation. It also goes to prove a case 
that, the conflict has gone beyond just land dispute. The point remains that as long as the court 
verdicts are seen in subjective angles and therefore produce outcomes that although endorsed by 
the Nkonya’s are continuously rejected by the Alavanyos, the conflict will persist. This goes a 
step further to throw light on the position of Burton (1997, pp. 94-95) that the ‘legal system is no 
longer an effective means of social control’. His arguments are that conflict resolution defies the 
basis of criminal system as a platform for dealing with conflict. To him, conflict resolution takes 
its root from a theoretical orientation that postulates that social stability such as is vital for 
promoting law and order can never be feasible unless there are institutions that ensure that 
human needs are attended to. He is however quick to underscore that the legal system in spite of 
its limitations is not entirely immaterial. He argues that it presents itself as very pivotal in 
‘disputes which are confined to interpretation of documents, and disputes over material interests 
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in respect of which there are consensus property norms’, while conflict resolution becomes the 
only way out when dealing with non-negotiable human needs. That notwithstanding, Burton does 
not come clear on the boundaries between the roles of both the legal system and conflict 
resolution. Going by his arguments that disagreements which are based on the interpretation of 
documents are better dealt with by the legal system, why has the Ghanaian legal system not been 
able to settle the case since the various judgments have been based on the clarifications of 
existing documents on the land under contention such the Grunner map, previous judgments, 
local deeds of agreements among the Nkonya and Alavanyo? 
Lawyer Opoku’s position given during my interview with him above not only embarrasses the 
existing theoretical standpoints but also exonerates the legal regime from the cloak of 
ineffectiveness. His arguments are that the execution of the judgment which is the preserve of the 
individual judgment creditor is the final stage of the judicial process, without which the 
judgment will be incomplete. Thus while the law courts have dealt judiciously with cases 
brought before them, the onus is on the Nkonya’s (judgment creditor) to make sure they execute 
the judgment to complete the process; a blame the court cannot share and a point the Nkonyas 
seemed to have missed when they place the blame at the door steps of government. It is worth 
pointing out that Lawyer Opoku’s argument while in conflict with Bombande’s argument that 
the responsibility of the judgment execution lies with the government62, is consistent with basic 
legal standpoints on the responsibilities of the judgment creditor (The Registrars Handbook, 
2011).  But can the execution really put an end to the age long conflict as Lawyer Opoku puts 
across? I argue that while such a position will more than ever solidify and entrench the Nkonyas 
claims to the land, it will also spark disappointment on the part of the Alavanyos and ultimately 
end in more violent forms of actions. The subsequent reaction from the Nkonyas will but only 
seek to increase the violence and make the conflict more protracted. 
The apparent limitation of the legal system in the dispensation of peace the Nkonyas and 
Alavanyos have led to the use of other systems like Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). ADR 
is seen as a substitute to court room litigation for resolving conflict and comes in various forms 
such as independent mediation committees and non-binding foreign involvements (Midodzi & 
Imoro, 2011; Yakohene, 2012). While Edwards (1986) argues that ADR reflects a serious new 
                                                          
62 Interview Conducted with Bombande E. at Accra (Conducted in English)  
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efforts to design workable and fair alternatives to our traditional judicial systems, the reality is 
yet to be realized in the case under review; where the ADR has widened the gap between the 
Nkonyas and Alavanyos and worsened the situation at best. 
In making a contribution towards the management of PSC, Azar (1990, p. 18) notes that although 
several avenues for redress exist, any attempt that does not ‘tackle the deeper dynamics 
underlying the crisis will be temporarily successful at best’.  He therefore advocate the use of 
what he calls track two diplomacy which will among other things place a premium on ‘the 
promotion of peaceful relations between warring parties without reliance upon official efforts’ 
instead of the conventional track one diplomacy. He indicates among other alternative efforts, 
the role of the third party mediation which is adopted to encourage the conflicting parties to meet 
in the form of mediation efforts. This sheds light on the assertion of Shavell (1995) that though 
specific approaches to ADR exist and differ significantly from one another, the presence of a 
third party is common to all of them. While the ADR was encouraged in the Nkonya and 
Alavanyo conflict as a result of the limitations from the other conflict resolution efforts like the 
court, I contend that the mediation efforts used in the Nkonya and Alavanyo case has in itself 
become problematic over the years. Of the three committees have been put in place; the Acquah 
Committee (1992), Mireku Committee (1995) and the Nkonya-Alavanyo Conflict Mediation 
Committee together with its working branch the Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) (2003), 
little information exist on their outcomes. The Acquah Committee was never able to sit for 
hearings as the conflict flared at the time again. The Mireku Committee on the other hand was 
able to sit and subsequently wrote a report but nothing has been heard of the report again 
(Tsikata & Seini, 2004). The recent committee which was mostly referred to during the field trip 
was perhaps in response to calls to find immediate and lasting solution to the conflict. However, 
the mediation committee is also yet to produce the much expected results. 
Azar (1990) suggests that a serious difficulty with both track two and third party mediation is a 
baggage of bias and different agendas that come with the mediator which mostly affect the 
outcome in diverse ways. In the case under review, such biases appears to have taken a strong 
position according to the narratives of the Nkonya citizens. William K. for example interprets a 
statement that ‘they (Nkonya people) should not be slaves to court rulings and map’ from one of 
the mediators as a comment in bad faith and one that seems to suggest that the mediators are all 
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out to support the Alavanyos. He also admits that another comment that equates them to ordinary 
villagers suggest some form of disrespect on the part of some of the mediators. Similarly, 
Kwadwo T. also admitted that the Mediation Committee’s suggestion that they share the land in 
question is one of many geared towards denying them of their age long inheritance. A case that 
forced them out of the committee. Although the accusation that they should not be slaves to court 
rulings and maps was never denied by Mr. Bombande, who instead argued, during an interview 
with him, that he was taken out of context, the other allegations remain to be substantiated. This 
gives meaning to the position of Zartman (1995, p. 4) that ‘mediation is an intrusion especially 
difficult to legitimate in internal conflicts’. I argue that until such times when the mediation 
parties can appear unbiased at least in the eyes of both the Nkonya and Alavanyo, their efforts 
will only solidify and at best distant the groups instead of bringing them together to find common 
grounds to dealing with the conflict. This not only gives credence to Azar but also meaning to 
Bercovitch’s (2004) argument that not every intractable dispute can me mediated. The point also 
embraces the contention of Noaga (2013b) that most conflicts have become protracted due 
mainly to the type and nature of resolution mechanisms that are used in finding solutions to 
them. Thus as I listened and observed, I came to a conclusion that the conflict resolution efforts 
have not been effective or proactive enough in their quest for solutions. In most cases, they are 
establish too little too late in the wake of an escalation and when the tensions go down, they 
either fade into oblivion or are abandoned by the conflicting parties who tend to lose confidence 
in such committees and bodies.  
Beyond all these entrenched positions is the quest for survival which can be seen in Azar’s 
human needs variable and Burton’s need theory, which goes beyond the recognition and 
satisfaction of basic needs.  At the core of Burton’s (1997) need theory is the idea that the 
endemic nature of structural violence and forced compliance do not have the capacity of 
satisfying the basic needs of individuals and groups. Instead, structural violence will often be met 
with violent resistance from various groups in the pursuits of their human needs notwithstanding 
the eminent consequence. Burton (1997, p. 36) writes that if human ‘needs are not satisfied there 
would be costly conflict’, pointing out that religious and ethnic conflicts for example are 
offshoots of the quests of such needs. To Burton, the bottom line is that human needs have risen 
to such prominence in human existence that they defy the strength of deterrence and complains 
and ultimately leads to violent resistance. Burton theory is very relevant in the case under study. 
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The need theory like Azar’s position sheds light on a root issue (land) and related insecurity and 
deprivation that has the strength to against all odds stimulate the conflict. What Burton’s theory 
does not suggest is the best way to actualise these human needs and who actually does the 
categorisation of the needs of the conflicting parties. Another point of concern is whether 
structural categorisation taken from Abraham Maslow’s need theory which Väyrynen (2001) 
indicates is ‘widely employed in social science’, is indeed necessary in the context of analysis of 
conflicts of this type. If indeed they are then, which one do we have to satisfy first? Thus while 
land (physical human need) appears to take a centre stage in the conflict, evidence abound from 
the Nkonya chronicle that other structural needs such as ethnicity and its consequent alienation 
(see Barth 1969), groupism (Brubaker, 2004), insecurity, injustice, among others have become 
endemic and have thus become very significant in the conflict. With these, I argue that long after 
the land issue has been dealt with, these other structural needs more especially ethnicity (the 
need to belong) will surface to take the conflict to a different level making it further intractable. 
While Nkonyas and Alavanyos are subsistent farmers who rely predominantly on farming to 
survive and therefore the significance of land in their live, the case will be entirely different far 
south on the shores of the Gulf of Guinea where residences are predominantly fishermen. More 
importantly, the need theory appears to have been over emphasised. My contention is that given 
the insatiability of human needs (Dwivedi, 2006),  the over reliance on needs in themselves at 
best stand to make the conflict intractable as different needs are likely to prop up with each 
seeking and demanding attention much to the neglect of other important aspects such as the 
societal orientations and structures. 
Again, the people of Nkonya made it clear that people who have over the years breached the law 
in the area have not received serious punishment to deter others from perpetrating similar acts. 
My position is that such unrestrained mayhems against ordinary civilians often catapults a 
goodwill message to prospective belligerents that they can actually do more and go unpunished.  
In the face of this, respondents contend that they have had to deal with unheard of levels of 
lawlessness especially in recent time. They argue for instance that the open defiance of court 
orders are a by-product of this culture of impunity that have been further fuelled by the lack of 
punitive measures. In the face of such impunity, the quest for revenge is amplified especially on 
the part of people who have been greatly affected either by their loss of livelihood and or of 
family members. This position is in consonance with arguments by criminologists who argue that 
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punitive actions are taken as a way of averting future wrongdoings (Beccaria, 1963), and also as 
a way of registering societal discontentment of certain behaviours (Durkheim, 1947).  
The greed of the Alavanyos, according to respondents, is also to blame for the long standing 
nature the conflict has taken. This somewhat presents not only an endorsement of the greed and 
grievance theory, but also an extension of it as theorised by Collier and Hoeffler (2000). At the 
core of their theory, is the proposition that countries with abundant natural resources have a 
predisposition to violent conflict as against those without. They argue that rebellious groups are 
more likely to be driven by the control of these natural resources than by grievances caused by 
actual differences with ethnic divisions, and or other reasons given for the start of civil wars. 
This contention remains largely unsubstantiated at least in the case under review. For example 
there are no evidences to suggest that the incentives from the land help keep the Alavanyos in the 
fight and while the theory links economic incentives as the main reason for the outbreak of 
hostilities, the Nkonya’s sites greed for the persistence instead of the cause of the conflict. 
Although the theory has being criticized for its generalization, especially because of the notion 
that civil wars are instigated by extremely multifaceted social processes that are dependent on 
historical content of a given system (Nathan, 2005, p. 11), however, if it does proves that the 
Alavanyos are relying on the economic incentives form the disputed land to finance their 
struggle against the Nkonya’s, it can be an extension if not a total endorsement of the greed and 
grievance theory. On the other hand, within my brief stay in Nkonya, I can say on a hind sight 
that they are aggrieved with the turnout of events. Their position that their violent acts are merely 
drawn out of their quest for vengeance is synonymous of this claim. In this regard, while the 
Nkonyas claim the greed of the Alavanyos are responsible for the intractable nature of the 
conflict, it will not be misleading to suggest that, the grievance of the Nkonya people is also in 
part responsible for their own involvement in the conflict to date.  
Another point worth noting is the influence of party politics on the dynamics of the conflict 
which the Nkonyas say is responsible to the intractable nature of the conflict. Their arguments 
are that the Alavanyos are the favourites of the ruling NDC and therefore are been supported. 
Does this in anyway suggest the Nkonyas are by default NPP? How come 25 of the 26 
parliamentary seats went to the ruling NDC in the region including the Nkonya area with the 
only one outstanding going to an independent candidate in the 2012 general elections? (Peace 
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Fm Online). And how come the conflict was never settled during the NPP regime from 2000 to 
2008? I contend that answers to these questions will go a long way to underscore or reject the 
claim. While it is a truism that the Volta Region has been tagged the ‘world bank’ of the ruling 
NDC as a result of the massive electoral endorsement it receives from the region (Asamoah, 
2014), going by the cliché that politics is about numbers, I do not think the ruling party would 
want to lose the votes of the people of Nkonya by openly supporting a faction in the conflict. 
Unfortunately, since politics remains a delicate subject by its nature further probing in this regard 
was not possible. Lawyer Opoku agrees with his people on the role of politics when he argued 
during an interview with him that the land case has always been politicised. He is however hasty 
to discredit its correlation with the intractability of the conflict.  It worth mentioning that party 
politics permeates every aspects of the Ghanaian society; the result has been the extremely 
pervading party discipline which has created a polarized citizenry on political party fault lines. 
The reality is that nothing goes on without been viewed with a political party lens. In the arena of 
conflict, Tsikata and Wayo (2004) write that the management of conflicts have significant 
electoral repercussions for governments and their political parties especially the NDC and NPP.  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
In the above section, I have tried to make a synchronisation between theory and the findings 
from the field. The conflict under study resembles in character and forms to a greater extent the 
postulations of Azar. It is principally an age long land dispute which flares occasionally when 
triggered by human activities on the land usually in their quest to satisfy their needs and backed 
by the activities of the state. The end results of such long standing conflict as argued by the 
Nkonyas are also in consonance with Azar’s prognosis with very little variations.  
While various reasons have been given as to why most protracted conflicts end up being 
protracted, the Nkonyas have argued from the findings presented above that the non-execution of 
the various verdicts of the courts, the lack of punitive measures against violators of the law, the 
nature of the conflict resolution mechanisms practised, greed of the Alavanyos as well as the 
political undertones that underpins the conflict are to a greater extent responsible for the 
persistence of the conflict. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this thesis was to interrogate the Nkonya –Alavanyo conflict and find answers to the 
questions; what are the causes of the conflict? What effects has the conflict caused? What 
attempts have been made at addressing the conflict and why has the conflict persisted to date? 
While the main aim was to look at the reasons for which the conflict has remained insoluble for 
close to a century, the critical engagement with the background issues was imperative in 
understanding the dynamics of the conflict and ultimately answering the main research question. 
In order to achieve this purpose and also in line with the claim of conflict been under researched, 
I made a field trip to Nkonya to conduct an ethnographic research. In this concluding section of 
the thesis, I will briefly present a summary of the research with emphasis on the findings and 
ends on some suggestions for further researches which were realized in the course of the study. 
Focusing principally on answering the above research questions, this thesis has produced a 
number of conclusions. Fist, on the causes of the conflict, Azar (1990) takes on the diversity of 
the groups in societies (in this case ethnic identities) and concludes that societies made up of 
different groups are more prone to conflict. This point though arguable when judged from the 
fact that other multiple entities have existed for centuries without violence or the potential for it, 
seems to fit perfectly in the Nkonya-Alavanyo case. Like other need based theorists such as 
Burton, Azar notes that people’s inability to get access to basic needs (land for farming) is a 
recipe for violent conflict.  He further notes that the way and manner the government and by 
extension the state handles the satisfaction of basic needs of its citizenry is also a factor that may 
or may not cause PSC, a point he observed has the potential of pushing parties into seeking 
international assistance. Azar’s arguments are that even in the event of the existence of all the 
above, PSC remains latent until triggered by the actions and strategies of the community and the 
state as well as other built in properties of the conflict. 
These are quite consistent with the findings on the field. According to the Nkonyas, The conflict 
is primarily caused by a dispute over land (basic human need) which finds its drive for violence 
and mayhem in the differences of the two ethnic groups (communal component). More so, the 
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state’s (Ghana) inability to safeguard the interest of the people by making land available for them 
due mainly to its land tenure governance is also recognizable point of note (the role of 
government and state). However, as Azar (1990) points out the conflict remains latent until 
triggered by the activities of individuals such as unprovoked killings, unauthorized burning and 
cutting of timber, farming among others (actions and strategies of the community) and the 
related perception they have formed about each other over the years. The failure of the state’s 
strategy of using co-option measures which are made manifest in the various interventions as a 
way of alleviating communal grievances, has pushed the Nkonyas into seeking sanctuary in self-
defence which has often precipitated a violent offshoots from them. The perceptions and 
opinions (built in mechanism) that have been formed also sparks the conflict.  
Azar (1990) posits that depending on the role the state plays in handling the PSC, disputants seek 
assistance from international bodies whose support always come with some form of conditions. 
At least this has not happened in the case under consideration. The Nkonya and Alavanyo 
conflict has remained strictly within the boundaries of Ghana. The fact that this conflict has not 
taken an international dimension does not discredit the work of Azar by any means.  Instead, it 
does suggests the uniqueness of each conflict orchestrated mostly by potential interests, 
geography, culture and its related issues such as religion and ethnicity.   
To Azar (1990), the result of PSC such as Nkonya and Alavanyo includes degeneration of 
physical security, institutional deformity, denting of communication among conflicting parties 
and further deepening on the reliance on foreign help. This also to a greater degree paints a vivid 
picture of the situation in Nkonya.  According to the respondents, they have been living in fear 
for a very long time, a point orchestrated by their loss of assurance in the potency of the security 
services and agencies. Such loss of confidence has resulted in not only in weakening the various 
institutions but have also blighted the chances of possible cooperation and further peaceful 
engagements.  
On the note of the persistence of the conflict, the respondents unanimously acknowledged that 
although many efforts have been made at solving the conflict, the conflict has remained insoluble 
because of; the non-execution of the various judgments of the courts, the lack of punitive 
measures against violators of the law, the nature of the conflict resolution mechanisms practised, 
greed of the Alavanyos as well as the political undertones that underpins the conflict.  
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The case of the non-execution of the court’s verdicts and by extension the issue of justice and or 
perceived injustice generally as chronicled by the people of Nkonyas gives meaning not only to 
Meernik’s (2005) contention that the nonexistence of justice is a recipe for violence but also to 
the argument of Vallacher et al (2010) that the dispensation of justice has the potency of 
controlling behaviours of people in conflict. While the court claims sanctuary in the dispensation 
of issues brought before it, theorist like Burton (1997) has also suggested inefficiencies in the 
legal system and have thus called for institutions that tackles the issue of human needs. 
Although, on his part, Lawyers Opoku’s legal arguments points to a closure of the conflict with 
the execution of the judgment, I maintain that such positions will in the end only at best seek to 
increase hostilities and make the conflict more protracted, a point that give credit to Burton’s 
arguments.  
The Nkonya’s argument that the absence of punitive measures muted out to violators of the law 
over the years has served as a motivating factor for increased violence is in consonance with the 
Beccaria (1963) and indeed most criminologist that punishments of various forms acts as a 
means of preventing future occurrences of wrongful acts (see also Durkheim 1947). 
Again while the deficiencies in the legal regime paved way for the use ADRs, more is needed to 
endorse the claim of Edwards (1986) that ADRs mirror a serious effort for producing a 
replacement to the tradition judicial system at least in the case of the Nkonya and Alavanyo. 
Adding his voice to the management of PSC, Azar (1990) argued for the use of track two 
diplomacy which encouraged the establishment of cordial relations between disputants claiming 
among other things that any attempt at redress that does not deal with the fundamentals of the 
conflict will as best only succeed temporarily. He further points out that bias are often associated 
with both track two and third party mediation and this often significantly affects the results of 
their work. Azar’s contention finds meaning in the claim of the respondents that the conflict has 
persisted because of the nature of the conflict resolution efforts as they see the mediators as 
having a preconceived idea to support the Alavanyos. The point also supports the proposition 
that ‘mediation is an intrusion especially difficult to legitimate in internal conflicts’ (Zartman, 
1995, p. 4). 
While the Nkonya have been in this struggle because of their grievance of being denied their 
ancestral right of land ownership, they site the greed of the Alavanyos a major reason for the 
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intractability of the conflict. Though this largely remains unsubstantiated allegation yet to be 
corroborated, I argue that if it is established to be true, it will not only endorse the greed and 
grievance theory of Collier and Hoeffler (2000) but will also extend it. For although, Collier and 
Hoeffler argue among other things that greed has the strength of starting civil wars mainly 
because of the wealth the fighter are likely to gain for their cause, the case under review seeks to 
suggest that it cannot only start a civil war (boundary conflict in this case) but also sustains it.   
The people of Nkonya also blame the persistence of the conflict on the extreme politicization of 
it by various political parties and governments. By virtue of the fact that party politics have 
become very sensitive and have rendered in its wake a polarized society, this research could not 
push beyond these claims. What is certain, is that the management of this conflict as Tsikata and 
Seini (2004, p. 24) put it has a huge electoral consequence for various political parties and their 
government. 
Thus, this conflict is a battle for survival. It clearly underscores the significance of human needs 
in the life of the people of Nkonya. It is worth pointing out that although Azar, takes on the 
satisfaction of basic human needs, Burton (1997) expands this arguing that human needs goes 
beyond the satisfaction of basic needs. He argues among other things that when human needs are 
not attended to, the end results are costly conflicts as they have the strength to even defy 
deterrence. Since the land, security, justice and or injustice and indeed peace are to a greater 
extend a human need, it will be a hasty conclusion or perhaps fallacious for anyone to conclude 
that the Nkonya and Alavanyo conflict is only an expressions of impulsive blood lust or an 
unescapable historical upheaval embedded in the land question. Instead, this research argues that 
a combination of factors mostly human need factors made manifest in the land question and its 
related issues such as security, justice and peace among many others which have not been well 
attended to over the years should be blame for the insoluble nature of the conflict between the 
Nkonyas and Alavanyos. 
 
Among the emerging issues that came up in the course of the study, was whether or not this 
conflict is an inter-ethnic conflict as described by Tsikata and Seini (2004) and indeed all the 
other literature used. In the end, although little attention was given to this as it was not the main 
burden of the research, a few points are worth mentioning. First, in the light of Bate’s (1982) 
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definition that ethnic conflicts constitutes a disagreement between groups over scarce resources 
and the seemingly endorsement by Tsikata and Seini (2004) that ethnic conflict always involve 
the contention over resources (land in the case under review), it would make sense to conclude 
that the Nkonya-Alavanyo conflict is an ethnic conflict. However, looking at Lake and 
Rothchild’s (1996) definition of ethnicity and Brubakar’s (2004) position that ethnic conflict 
transcends just two groups in conflict, I contend that the position of whether or not the conflict 
between Nkonya and Alavanyo is an ethnic conflict is still a matter of further debate and 
research. 
In the light of the limitations that this research encountered, specifically those that precipitated 
my inability to go to Alavanyo (time, resource, and language) I would propose that a future study 
takes on the account of the Alavanyos. By getting their views, it will be possible to make for 
example a general claim as to why the conflict has defied resolution and help conclude my 
research.  Again, since one of the areas that featured prominently in the research was the legal 
regime, I suggest that a future study takes on the contending views on the significance of the law 
court in the dispensation of peace as has been advanced especially in the Nkonya and Alavanyo 
conflict. 
I have no doubt that this research will be a valuable input to the obtainable body of works on the 
case of Nkonya and Alavanyo in Ghana especially as it brings to bear a different aspect of the 
conflict that has hitherto not been tackled at least within the limited literature available. 
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